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Abstract
In his early writings Max Horkheimer explored the issues surrounding biological explanation in Kantian and
neo-Kantian philosophy. After he became director of the Institut für Sozialforschung in 1930, he continued to
explore the relationships between biology, materialism, philosophy, and social theory. This interest was
reflected both in his editorial policy for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung and in his own scholarly
development that led to the development of critical theory in the later 1930s and the anti-Semitism research
of the 1940s. Horkheimer's interests and ambitions also generated resistance from other social scientists. The
Berlin ethnologist Richard Thurnwald, along with his student and colleague Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, came
into direct conflict with Horkheimer—and with each other—over the significance of biology for social
research. This conflict with Horkheimer further ignited a vigorous debate between Thurnwald and Mühlmann
about a concept that also became a central issue in Horkheimer's thought and editorial practice: race.
Thurnwald had begun his career as a founder of the German Society for Racial Hygiene, but by the 1920s he
had developed into a vocal critic of what he saw as the reductive pseudo-Darwinism of racial hygiene and
eugenics.
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“Diesmal fehlt die Biologie!”: Max Horkheimer, Richard Thurnwald, and the 
Biological Prehistory of German Sozialforschung 
 
Introduction: Biology, Social Research, and Disciplinary Authority 
 
 The turbulent history of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social 
Research; hereafter Institut) with its several stations including Frankfurt, Geneva, Paris, 
and New York, has become so central to the many narratives of twentieth-century social 
thought that it is easy to forget that in its early history, the Institut did not stand out in the 
German academic field.  It was one of a number of attempts to redevelop the institutional 
structure of German scholarship both inside and outside existing university frameworks.  
The efforts of the Institut’s members were not always repaid with respect or 
understanding.  When Max Horkheimer assumed the directorship in 1930 and sought to 
reinvigorate the Institut’s publication program, be encountered vigorous resistance from 
other scholars.  The Institut’s house journal, the Archiv für die Geschichte des 
Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung (Archive for the History of Socialism and the 
Workers’ Movement; known as Grünbergs Archiv) was to become the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung (Journal of Social Research; hereafter: ZfS), an organ for the 
dissemination of the Institut’s work across the numerous disciplines engaged in research 
into social phenomena.1  Even some of Horkheimer’s closer colleagues perceived his 
                                                 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this article are by the author. 
1  Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social 
Research 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 26-27.  Jay quotes Leo Lowenthal as follows: The ZfS 
was “less a forum for different viewpoints than a platform for the Institut’s convictions.”  See also: Rolf 
Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael 
Robertson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 38, 116-19.  After the emigration of Horkheimer and the Institut 
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moves as a competitive threat to their own publication programs.  Horkheimer, for 
example, even sent Leo Lowenthal by plane to speak to the sociologist Leopold von 
Wiese in Cologne, who had expressed concern that the editorial program of the ZfS 
would overlap with that of his own journal, the Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie 
(Cologne Quarterly of Sociology).2 
 The Berlin ethnologist and sociologist Richard Thurnwald raised perhaps the most 
energetic opposition to Horkheimer’s project from within the field of German social 
science.  Thurnwald was editor-in-chief of the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Soziologie, which he was at that moment in the process of redefining and reorganizing 
into a multilingual (German-English) journal with the bilingual title Sociologus: 
Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie/A Journal of Sociology and Social 
Psychology (hereafter: Sociologus/ZVS).3  Thurnwald and his student, colleague, and 
managing editor, Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, corresponded with Horkheimer and at length 
among themselves about the Institut, the ZfS, the status of the ZfS relative to their own 
journal, and Horkheimer’s motivations and intentions.4  Their exchange demonstrates that 
                                                                                                                                                 
to New York, the ZfS was renamed Studies in Philosophy and Social Science for its final two volumes 
(VIII/1939 and IX/1941).   
2  Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 27.  Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 112.  
3  On the fluid disciplinary and methodological status of Völkerpsychologie see: Matti Bunzl, “Franz Boas 
and the Humboldtian Tradition: From Volksgeist and Nationalcharakter to an Anthropolgical Concept of 
Culture,” In Volksgeist as Method and Ethic.  History of Anthropology, ed. George W. Stocking, Jr., vol. 8 
(Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 17-78.  Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and 
Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 52-4. 
4  This material is heretofore unremarked in the published primary and secondary literature on the early 
history of the Institut and the ZfS.  It is represented in correspondence from between 1931 and 1933 found 
in the Richard Christian Thurnwald Papers held in the Department of Manuscripts and Archives at the 
Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.  Thurnwald was Visiting 
Professor at Yale intermittently in the 1930s.  The Thurnwald Papers contain three letters from Horkheimer 
to Thurnwald that are not published in the Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften.  They are dated 6 August 
1932, 7 November 1932, and 28 January 1933.  One unpublished letter (of 15 December 1932) from 
Thurnwald to Horkheimer is also in the Thurnwald collection.  The correspondence between Thurnwald 
and Mühlmann, and between them and their publishers, also discusses the matter at length, and refers to a 
visit made by Horkheimer to Mühlmann in Berlin in late 1931 that is also unremarked in the literature. 
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at this early stage, Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues framed the intellectual and 
institutional development of their research program around the problem of disciplinary 
definition and control.  Other scholars registered their arguments, and sought to parry 
their moves.5 
The disciplinary concept that became the focus of the disagreements between 
Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and Mühlmann was biology.  Though their educational paths 
and political investments differed greatly, both Horkheimer and Thurnwald sought at the 
beginning of their scholarly careers to explore how human social phenomena might fall 
within the purview of the rapidly expanding methods and claims of the biological field.  
They went on, in the 1920s and 1930s, to develop critiques of what they perceived to be 
an inappropriate identification of biology with social thought and theory.  Again, their 
critiques were profoundly different: Horkheimer’s represented a philosophically 
grounded attempt to redevelop the basic disciplinary structure of social inquiry, and 
Thurnwald’s emerged from his encounter with race theory and his work on the use of 
anthropological field methods in the exploration of social behavior.  Both scholars, 
however, hoped to influence social praxis through their research, and they therefore 
recognized – though only at first through resistance to one another – that their 
disciplinary concerns covered much of the same intellectual and institutional ground.  
The conflict between them therefore originated as a personal disagreement generated by 
conflicting institutional interests.  Nonetheless it threw off a series of documents that 
                                                 
5  The Institut’s early program and publications so highlighted the problems of disciplinarity in the 
development of new modes of social research that recent scholars and critics have willingly applied the 
anachronistic term “interdisciplinary” to its work.  Helmut Dubiel notes that the term ‘interdisciplinary’ 
first came into use in the United States during the 1950s.  Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in 
the Development of Critical Theory, trans. Benjamin Gregg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 119-27, 189n7.  
This anachronism notwithstanding, scholarship on the Institut’s program in the early and mid-1930s has 
settled on the concept “interdisciplinary materialism” as the most appropriate description of the Institut’s 
goals and methods. 
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provide a nuanced representation of how biology as a disciplinary concept mapped the 
boundary conditions not only for their overlapping scholarly work and practice, but also 
their theorization of social research in general. 
In Horkheimer’s exchange with Thurnwald and Mühlmann, biology’s politically 
and ideologically charged relationship with numerous other fields of scholarly inquiry 
into social phenomena became the flash point.  In the early 1930s, the period of the initial 
construction of the programs of and justifications for the Institut and the ZfS, biology 
represented the far edge of the Institut’s potential network of disciplinary contact and 
communication.  Thurnwald and Mühlmann also continually expressed concern about 
biology’s relationship to sociology and social research in Sociologus/ZVS, in their own 
ethnographic and sociological research, and in their correspondence.6  Later, after their 
conflict, Horkheimer refrained from claims that biology stood within the disciplinary 
purview of the Institut’s program.  Nonetheless, biology and its structures of justification 
had left indelible marks on the development of Horkheimer’s thought, on the Institut’s 
practice, and on the editorial program of the ZfS.  In the simplest sense, Horkheimer 
chose after his disagreement with Thurnwald and Mühlmann to eliminate biology from 
the programmatic content of the Institut’s ‘interdisciplinary materialism.’  He retained it, 
however, as a central moment of reference in his own argument and practice.7 
                                                 
6  The early volumes of Sociologus/ZVS always included a section of reviews of recent publications in 
“Biologie.”   
7  Philosophical interest in the consequences of biological inquiry has recently reemerged among the 
intellectual successors to the Institut, however, in the work of Jürgen Habermas, who has dedicated much 
of his effort in the past few years to issues of bioethics and the philosophical and ethical consequences of 
the potential for the genetic manipulation of embryos.  See Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 
trans. William Rehg, Hella Beister, and Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).  The Deutsche Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie 50.2 (2002) was dedicated in large part to an exchange between Habermas and several 
respondents on Habermas’s bioethical turn. 
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Both Horkheimer and Thurnwald perceived that the term biology in the early 
twentieth century did not represent a strictly defined discipline, but rather a multifarious 
field that had developed in the nineteenth century through attempts to develop a complete 
understanding of life, from the level of the physiochemical mechanisms of the cell to the 
complex psychosocial manifestations of human behavior.  They were not alone in their 
polyvalent understanding of the conceptual and programmatic content of biology.  Many 
of the leading representatives of biological thought and institutions competed to lay claim 
to the most audacious of total arguments about the organization of the natural world, 
from the simplest structure of matter to the most complex manifestations of the diversity 
of life – including individual and social behavior.  Biology therefore became not a 
methodologically autonomous field of scientific investigation, but rather a set discursive 
links among proliferating sets of institutions and sub-disciplines.8  The term delineated a 
kind of vestigial negative image of the interests held and promulgated by various actors 
inquiring into living organisms, including the human, and the biological field functioned 
as a fluid and protean network of scholars and commentators who competed for prestige 
and resources.  Well into the twentieth century, in fact, there were not even discrete 
departments marked by the rubric ‘biology’ in German universities.  Biology was rather a 
loosely applied marker of the both commonalities and the competition between the 
institutionally grounded fields of anatomy, physiology, botany, zoology, natural history, 
and various branches of medicine.9  Biology’s meta-disciplinary character led to 
                                                 
8  For a nuanced summary of biology’s position as a constitutive concept among late nineteenth century 
German social reformers, see: Kevin Repp, “‘More Corporeal, More Concrete’: Liberal Humanism, 
Eugenics, and German Progressives at the Last Fin de Siècle,” Journal of Modern History 72 (September 
2000): 683-730. 
9  Lynn Nyhart, Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and German Universities, 1800-1900 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 205-6, 366-69. 
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controversy, but it also gave great persuasive power to those who chose to make biology 
a proxy for total explanation of the natural and human worlds.  A number of important 
scholars of late nineteenth century German intellectual history, including Gunter Mann, 
Herbert Schnädelbach, and Helmuth Plessner, have used the term “biologism” to 
represent this proliferation of persuasive claims, and have gone so far as to argue, like 
Plessner, that this period was the “hour of authoritarian biology.”10 
Charles Sedgwick Minot, the Harvard anatomist, noted biology’s fragmentary but 
ambitious character in a series of lectures he gave at the University of Jena in 1912, 
published in 1913 as Modern Problems of Biology.  In Minot’s opinion, “Unfortunately, 
biology has not yet become a united science, but consists of sundry disciplines more or 
less separated from one another.”11  Nonetheless he was fully confident that “true and 
real biology,” that is the incipient “unified biological science,” would answer the broadest 
human questions: “Consciousness, the relation of the soul to the body, the origin of 
reason, the relations of the external world to psychical perception, and most subjects of 
philosophical thought are fundamentally biological phenomena which the naturalist 
investigates and analyzes.”12   
                                                 
10  Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1933, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 99-100.  Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation: Über die politische 
Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982).  Gunther Mann, ed. Biologismus im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Enke, 1973). 
11  Charles S. Minot, Modern Problems of Biology: Lectures Delivered at the University of Jena, 
December, 1912 (Philadelphia: P. Blakiston’s Son, 1913), 103. 
12  Minot, Modern Problems, 103, 104.  Historians of biology still accept Minot’s logic.  Betty Smocovitis 
recapitulates much of his vocabulary in her resume of the early disciplinary development of American 
biology: “The struggle to unify the biological sciences is one of the central features of the history of 
biology.  Emerging only in the nineteenth century, biology was characterized by disunity to such an extent 
and for so long that repeated attempts to unify this science through professional societies proved to be a 
nearly impossible task.  Charting the rocky road toward organized biology in America during the 1889-
1923 period – a key period for the institutionalization of biology – historian Toby Appel concluded: 
‘Numerous biological sciences were established in America, but no unified science of biology.’  So 
formidable was this task that the hope of ever formulating a unified biological society representing a 
unified science of biology appeared to have been largely abandoned by 1923.”  Vassiliki Betty Smocovitis, 
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Thus in biology’s very lack of concrete disciplinary form, in its status as a meta-
disciplinary space of contingent, but potentially total scientific knowledge about humans 
as living, social beings, it represented both a positive and a negative model of the kind of 
interdisciplinary social research that both Horkheimer and Thurnwald hoped to be able to 
promote through their journals.  It thus revealed the full range of difficulties and frictions 
inherent in their institutional projects. 
 
Max Horkheimer, Sozialforschung, and the Valences of Materialism 
 
Recent literature describes the founding and early development of the Institut as 
the creation of an endowed space for exchange with and critique of the models of 
scholarship pursued within the rigid disciplinary structure of the German university 
system of the 1920s.  Martin Jay reads Horkheimer’s 1931 address on “The Current 
Condition of Social Philosophy and the Task of an Institute of Social Research [Die 
gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für 
Sozialforschung]” as proposing an “interdisciplinary, synthetic” scholarship on social 
phenomena that could unite the insights of the many disciplines and sub-disciplines 
proliferating within and around institutionalized scholarship in Germany.13  Taking up 
Horkheimer’s claim in his “Materialism and Metaphysics (Materialismus und 
Metaphysik)” that “materialism calls for the unification of philosophy and science,” 
several scholars employ the term “interdisciplinary materialism” to describe 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unifying Biology: The Evolutionary Synthesis and Evolutionary Biology (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996) 97-98. 
13  Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 25; Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 38-39.  
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Horkheimer’s program for the Institut and the ZfS in the 1930s.14  The choice of this term 
to describe Horkheimer’s project contains a particularly revealing irony: it recapitulates 
the historical roots of Horkheimer’s own reflections on the status of biology as a 
materialist project.   In many ways, late nineteenth century biology itself was a kind of 
“interdisciplinary materialism,” one that sought in the concept “life” a unification of 
scientific inquiry from the smallest scale to the largest through investigation of living 
organisms, their physical and chemical determinants, and their interactions.  For many 
reasons, of course, biology failed to become a systematic field offering a complete 
representation of the living world.  Not the least of these was the proliferation of claims 
under the rubric Lebensphilosophie.15  Nonetheless vigorous and often highly personal 
debates about whether life can be understood on a purely material basis raged in German 
academic philosophy and natural science throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth. 
The relationship between biological thought and materialism is complex, because 
materialism in the late nineteenth century had two valences that are generally read 
differently by natural scientists and social scientists: “mechanistic materialism” and 
“dialectical materialism.”16  Much of the fascination and much of the difficulty in reading 
Horkheimer’s early work emerges because when he spoke of “Materialismus” he always 
meant both categories.  Horkheimer’s programmatic “critical theory” of the mid-1930s 
                                                 
14  See: Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bonß, and John McCole, eds., On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).  The term “interdisciplinary materialism” is employed by both Jürgen 
Habermas and Wolfgang Bonß in the volume.  Axel Honneth prefers “interdisciplinary social science.”  
The quotation here is taken from Hauke Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism of Happiness: Max 
Horkheimer’s Materialist Deconstruction of Philosophy,” in Benhabib et al. 91.  Dubiel, despite his 
misgivings about the anachronistic character of the term, uses it. 
15  See: Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 139-160. 
16  Garland A. Allen, “The Classical Gene: Its Nature and Legacy,” Mutating Concepts, Evolving 
Disciplines: Genetics, Medicine and Society, L. S. Parker and R. A. Ankeny, eds. (Dordrecht/Boston: 
Kluwer, 2002) 11-41. 
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can in fact be read as an attempt to develop an academic practice that seeks to dismantle 
the barriers that appear to separate these two valences of materialism, and that have been 
consciously and unconsciously constructed by various established academic disciplines, 
especially philosophy and the natural sciences.17  Mechanistic materialism seeks 
reductionist explanations of physical and physiological phenomena through the 
development of arguments that complex wholes can be understood completely through 
analysis into their simpler constituent parts.  Mechanistic materialism thus understands 
change as the predictable responses of a system of parts to external forces.  Dialectical 
materialism accepts the explanatory power of the analysis of complex systems, but 
refuses to reduce these systems only to the interactions of their parts.  In dialectically 
understood systems, change is thus an emergent characteristic of the system in the 
irreducible entirety of its dynamics.18   
The history of biology is also the history of conflict between these two 
materialisms.  From the beginnings of biology as a concept, biological problems have 
driven the development of mechanistic materialism.  Building on Frederick Gregory’s 
claims about materialism in nineteenth century Germany, especially as it was found in the 
work of Carl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott, and Ludwig Büchner, Ernst Mayr emphasizes the 
centrality of this valence of materialism, which he calls “strongly reductionist 
materialism.”19  Mayr also emphasizes the ways in which scholars perceived change in 
                                                 
17  Stanley Pierson, Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 96. 
18  Allen, “The Classical Gene,” 17-19. 
19  Frederick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977).  
Ernst Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge: 
Belknap/Harvard, 1982), 128.  Important here is also the concept of Naturphilosophie and its consequences 
in philosophy and biology.  See: Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and 
Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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living systems teleologically throughout the nineteenth century.20  The biological thought 
of Ernst Haeckel, especially thorough its late nineteenth century mediation in Haeckel’s 
widely disseminated system of philosophical ‘monism,’ represents the most thorough 
attempt to construct a system of the total explanation of all of the phenomena of life, 
from the simplest chemical constituents to the most complex issues of human social and 
political behavior, out of the general postulates of mechanistic materialism.21  The at once 
simplest and most radical of Haeckel’s many statements of the foundational status of 
mechanistic causality in his thought comes at the beginning of his career, in the first of 
his great synthetic treatises, the General Morphology of the Organisms (Generelle 
Morphologie der Organismen; 1866).22  The preface to this work states its final goal: to 
explain organismal forms and their development “through mechanistic-causal explanation 
(durch mechanisch-kausale Begründing).”23  Haeckel’s claims reverberated for decades 
through German academic natural science and philosophy. 
Dialectical materialism as a concept is, of course, generally more closely 
associated with the historical, philosophical, and political traditions of Marxism than it is 
                                                 
20  Mayr, Growth, 528-31.  See also: Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in 
Nineteenth-Century German Biology, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).  Stephen Jay 
Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 1977). 
21  On Haeckel’s monism see: Jürgen Sandmann, Der Bruch mit der humanitären Tradition: Die 
Biologisierung der Ethik bei Ernst Haeckel und anderen Darwinsten seiner Zeit (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 
1990).  Horst Groschopp, Dissidenten: Freidenkerei und Kultur in Deutschland (Berlin: Dietz, 1997).  
From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004).  Hopelessly reductive but still often cited is: Daniel Gasman, The Scientific Origins of 
National Socialism (London: Macdonald Elsevier, 1971). 
22  The full (and baroque) title of Haeckel’s work emphasized the mechanistic qualities of his strategies of 
explanation: Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Formen-
Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie 
[General Morphology of the Organisms: General Foundations of the Organic Science of Forms, as 
Mechanistically Grounded through the Theory of Evolution as Reformed by Charles Darwin] (Berlin: G. 
Reimer, 1866). 
23  Quoted in Mayr, Growth, 115. 
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with biological thought.24  Yet it is precisely in the biological field of the period around 
1900 that dialectical materialism found its profoundest challenges.  If biology indeed held 
the potential to provide systematic – and possibly teleological – explanation of all of the 
phenomena of life including the social, then the integrative and antireductionist claims of 
dialectical thought seemed to life scientists and philosophers alike to be well suited to the 
diversity of their object of investigation.25  Beginning with Friedrich Engels, many 
socialist thinkers sought to explore how nature, life, and history might be construed as 
mutually constitutive.26  A wide range of German socialist thinkers also saw Darwinism 
as evidence for their proposed trajectories of historical and political change and 
development.  Predictably, their claims also generated resistance.27  Haeckel, for 
example, savaged any reading of evolutionary theory that appeared to venture support for 
socialist political claims.28  Anne Harrington, the most thorough recent historian of 
biological and psychological holism, represents succinctly the problem that these figures 
struggled to solve: it often appeared that “a mechanistic approach to nature had nothing in 
                                                 
24  Garland Allen notes how some scholars used “holistic” and “dialectical” interchangeably to refer to this 
valence of materialism, especially when it has been linked to the life sciences.  Garland Allen, “The 
Distinction between Mechanistic and Holistic Materialism,” In Allen, Life Science in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 103-6.  Martin Jay uses the terms “holistic” and 
“holism” largely synonymously with “totality” in his exploration of Western Marxism – at the same time 
that he emphasizes that that Marxism was “far more dialectical than materialist,” and that the Second 
International (1889-1914) “did not dwell with any sustained interest on the issue of totality.”  Martin Jay, 
Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984) 3, 66. 
25  The Sorbonne zoologist Marcel Prenant was perhaps the most prestigious practicing life scientist 
associated with this opinion in the 1930s.  See: Marcel Prenant, Biology and Marxism, trans. C. Desmond 
Greaves (New York: International Publishers, 1938).   
26  Critical Marxists of the twentieth century found Engels’s work reductive, but worthy of careful 
explication.  See: Ernst Bloch, “Exkurs über Engels’ Versuch ‘Dialektik der Natur,” In Bloch, Das 
Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), 359-71. 
27  See: Richard Weikart, Socialist Darwinism: Evolution in German Socialist Thought From Marx to 
Bernstein (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1998). 
28  In 1877, Haeckel publicly accused his teacher and colleague Rudolf Virchow of giving solace to the 
partisans of socialist readings of evolutionary thought – and Virchow shot back in print with a vigorous 
denial of any such intent.  See: Peter Zigman, “Ernst Haeckel und Rudolf Virchow: Der Streit um den 
Charakter der Wissenschaft in der Auseinandersetzung um den Darwinismus,” Medizinhistorisches Journal 
35 (2000): 263-302. 
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common with a materialistic understanding of nature.”29  Martin Jay’s arguments that 
twentieth century Western Marxists reconstructed a totalizing theory of nature and 
society thus gain an additional layer.30  Interest in dialectical models of explanation 
among biologists exists even into the present, and the work of Richard Lewontin, most 
clearly articulated in his book written with Richard Levins and entitled The Dialectical 
Biologist, articulates the issues involved most clearly.  Lewontin, rare among practicing 
biological scientists, is also willing to credit the Marxist tradition with a large and direct 
measure of influence over biological explanation.31 
Scholarly interest in the problems raised by attempts to develop systems of 
investigation and explanation that could be commensurate to the apparent irreducibility 
of living systems in fact well predates Marxist thought.  Ernst Cassirer regarded this issue 
as a central element in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy.32  He argues that 
the entirety of the half of the Critique of Judgment dedicated to “teleological judgment” – 
that is to the problem of developing standards of judgment adequate to the appearance of 
purposiveness in living organisms – seeks an answer to this friction between systematic, 
analytical explanation and interdependent living systems: 
It is no contradiction to imagine a nature that obeys the rules of connection 
according to law, as they are specified in the principles of substance, cause, and 
so on, and that in other respects discloses an irreducible diversity in the manifold 
                                                 
29  Anne Harrington. Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 13. 
30  Jay emphasizes that “German bourgeois culture during much of the nineteenth century tended to favor 
holistic modes of thought.”  Jay, Marxism and Totality, 73. 
31  Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985), 267-79. 
32  Jay also credits Cassirer with recognizing the significance of the “Discourse of Totality before Western 
Marxism.”  Jay, Marxism and Totality, 30-31. 
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of its appearances, a diversity that would never permit us to order them according 
to genus and species.33 
Cassirer thus describes Kant’s later philosophy of inquiry into living things as a kind of 
emergent dialectics of critical inquiry into an object of infinite diversity.  This moment of 
incommensurability in scientific explanation would haunt German academic philosophy 
throughout the nineteenth century, and dominate the interest of the generation of German 
neo-Kantian academic philosophers – of which Cassirer was perhaps the youngest 
important exponent – that trained Horkheimer and his many collaborators and 
competitors.34 
The relationship between the mechanistic and dialectical valences of materialism 
structured Horkheimer’s thought from its earliest development.  In the 1920s, 
Horkheimer and his colleagues, including Theodor W. Adorno, Georg Lukács, Ernst 
Bloch (and even Martin Heidegger in the pre-Sein und Zeit period) dedicated much of 
their philosophical effort to attempts to interrogate the varieties of materialism.35  This 
effort emerged from their attempts to delineate new territory within the discipline of 
philosophy that could separate them from their neo-Kantian teachers, who had invested 
much of their careers in mapping the boundaries of the natural sciences.36  Horkheimer’s 
university studies were situated within this set of attempts to reexamine the materialist 
                                                 
33  Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, trans. 
William Woglom and Charles Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 125. 
34  Lukács emphasized the underappreciated significance of Southwest German neo-Kantians Heinrich 
Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband in setting the terms of the late nineteenth-century debate about scientific 
inquiry, human life, and human society.  Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (Darmstadt: 
Luchterhand, 1974), 404-5, 521. 
35  Lukács and Horkheimer remained relatively sympathetic toward the positions held by the neo-Kantians.  
Bloch was not.  He introduces his chapter on them in Das Materialismusproblem with the lapidary sentence 
“The power to think conceptually decreased soon thereafter.”  Bloch, Materialismusproblem, 84. 
36  On the centrality of neo-Kantianism’s critique of natural-scientific epistemology in late nineteenth-
century German academic philosophy see: Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 56-58.  See also: Klaus 
Christian Köhnke, The Rise of neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and 
Positivism, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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tradition.  He studied philosophy extensively, but his understanding of both the potential 
and the limits of natural scientific inquiry developed largely out of his encounter with 
Gestalt psychology.  The early stages of Horkheimer’s doctoral training took place in the 
laboratory of the Gestalt psychologist Adhémar Gelb.37  Gelb and his collaborator Kurt 
Goldstein ran the Institute for Research into the Consequences of Brain Injuries at 
Frankfurt in the early 1920s, which explored experimental possibilities for the 
rehabilitation of soldiers with neurological injuries previously considered fully 
debilitating.38  Gelb and the Gestaltists perceived no disciplinary boundary between 
Gestalt psychology and biology, or between scientific inquiry, medicine, and the 
explanation of complex human perceptions and interactions.  Their understanding of 
physical reality and living systems was fundamentally holistic.  Anne Harrington, in her 
study of the valences of early twentieth-century German holistic thought, describes the 
guiding principle of early Gestalt psychology as follows: “…Gestalt theory argued for the 
possibility of retaining a place for human significance in nature but without sacrificing 
rigorous experimental standards of traditional natural science.”39  Horkheimer began his 
dissertation research at Gelb’s and Goldstein’s institute in 1921, and intended to explore 
the physiological functioning of vision.  For a number of reasons – including the fact that 
investigators in Copenhagen published work very similar to his dissertation research – 
Horkheimer chose not to pursue his empirical work with Gelb, and he developed his early 
                                                 
37  Adorno also worked for a time in Gelb’s laboratory.  Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 6, 23.  Wiggershaus, 
Frankfurt School, 44. 
38  Harrington, Reenchanted Science, 121, 145-6. 
39  Harrington, Reenchanted Science, 103.  See also: Mitchell G. Ash, Gestalt Psychology in German 
Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest for Objectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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academic writings as philosophical tracts under the Frankfurt neo-Kantian Hans 
Cornelius.40 
Both Horkheimer’s dissertation and his Habilitationsschrift addressed an aspect 
of the German philosophical tradition that bore directly on the development of biology as 
a concept.  This aspect was the same issue that drew Cassirer’s interest: Kant’s arguments 
about the nature of ‘teleological judgment’ in the Critique of Judgment.  The dissertation, 
completed in 1922 and entitled On the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment (Zur 
Antinomie der teleolgischen Urteilskraft), explored the problem of the explanation of 
living processes.  Kant regarded reason as inadequate for the investigation of living 
things, because those living things, when reduced to their constituent parts, appear not as 
a set of causally linked processes, but as a set of purposive structures.  In Kant’s critical 
system, therefore, only the faculty of judgment can elucidate life and its conceptual 
problems.41  Horkheimer argued that Kant’s views on the antinomy between reason and 
the teleological judgment which explains life generate a further antinomy, one that 
reveals a tension in Kant’s arguments about the correspondence between practical and 
theoretical judgment and thus prefigures the dialectical nature of later philosophical 
systems.42  This antinomy emerges concretely as that between teleological judgment and 
mechanical explanation.  Horkheimer reads Kant’s arguments, including those in the 
Critique of Judgment, as privileging mechanical explanation, because teleological 
judgment is only a heuristic device that enables inquiry into living processes that appear 
                                                 
40  Harrington, Reenchanted Science, 121.  Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 44-46.  On Cornelius’s 
influence on the early Frankfurt School see: Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: 
Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: Free Press, 1977), 7. 
41  Jay, Marxism and Totality, 48. 
42  See Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 46.  On the varied consequences of Kant’s concepts of teleology in 
nineteenth-century biological thought see Lenoir, Strategy of Life. 
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to be incommensurate to reason.  Thus in Horkheimer’s reading, Kant regards 
teleological judgment as a lesser form of inquiry, one that does not reach the level of true 
explanation.  Horkheimer makes this claim with specific reference to the disciplinary 
fields of physics and biology: 
4. Physics and biology: both have the same concept of event, namely the 
mechanical.  In any case, the sciences of “organic” and “inorganic” nature differ 
according to Kant not in the general structure of their explanations.  The former 
do require as a “makeshift” (U. 320) a teleological “guideline for the observation 
of a type of natural things” (U. 297).  Nonetheless both branches of the natural 
sciences – at least in all of their constitutive judgments – have the same concept 
of the formation and development of such things: that, namely, every natural 
object, “with respect to the elements that it receives from nature outside of itself, 
must only be regarded as an eduction” (U. 287).43 
Kant thus still fundamentally subordinates biological thought to physical thought, and 
Horkheimer sums up Kant’s opinion as follows: “If one wanted to understand the 
expressions development, growth, life processes etc. within biological theories as having 
a special meaning, that would be an error....”44 
                                                 
43  Max Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Gesammelte Schriften 2 
[Philosophische Frühschriften 1922-1932] (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1987), 46-47. “4. Physik und Biologie: 
beide haben denselben Begriff vom Geschehen, nämlich dem mechanischen.  Die Wissenschaften von der 
‘organischen’ und der ‘anorganischen’ Natur unterscheiden sich nach Kant jedenfalls nicht durch die 
allgemeine Struktur ihrer Erklärungen.  Die ersteren benötigen zwar als ‘Nothilfe’ (U. 320) einen 
teleologischen ‘Leitfaden für die Beobachtung einer Art von Naturdingen’ (U. 297), doch von der Bildung 
und Entwicklung solcher Dinge haben beide Zweige der Naturwissenschaften – wenigstens in allen ihren 
bestimmenden Urteilen – denselben Begriff: daß nämlich jeder Naturgegenstand, ‘was die Bestandteile 
betrifft, die er von der Natur außer ihm erhält, nur als Educt angesehen werden muß’ (U. 287)” 
44  Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie, 47.  “Wollte jemand die Ausdrücke Entwicklung, Wachstum, 
Lebensvorgänge u.s.w. in biologischen Theorien in besonderem Sinne verstehen, so wäre das ein Irrtum....” 
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 The Horkheimer of 1922 has a particular solution to this antinomy in Kant’s 
thought: the holistic quality of Gestalt thinking, which is in its most basic disciplinary 
form biological thought, because it addresses the wholeness of the organism.  
Horkheimer raises this point early in the dissertation, in the sections following his 
discussion of Kant’s “principle of formal purposiveness in nature (Prinzip der formalen 
Zweckmäßigkeit in der Natur).”  In the section entitled “Consequence of the Principle [of 
generation] for Biology in Particular (Konsequenz des Grundsatzes [der Erzeugung] für 
die Biologie im besonderen)” Horkheimer reduces Kant’s ideas to the simplest postulate 
of biological holism: “Kant’s application to biology can, in very simple brevity, be made 
clear in something like the following way. – The living body is a whole within nature.”45  
Horkheimer returns to this claim late in the dissertation, and uses it to rescue Kant’s 
system from its own inadequate understanding of living things.  First he notes that 
modern physics is beginning to demonstrate the same need for holistic explanation 
beyond the purely mechanical: “Mechanical explanation, which for Kant is explanation 
par excellence, is, as he himself witnesses, inadequate in the biological sciences....  
Modern research has now also clearly ascertained this inadequacy in physical 
problems.”46  Kant’s system therefore becomes open to the solution of its secondary 
antinomy through the holistic inquiry enabled by Gestalt thought: “In recent philosophy 
the theory of Gestalt qualities has stood in contrast to the Kantian view.  It argues that a 
whole as such has characteristics that are lost through division into parts, because they 
                                                 
45  Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie, 29.  “Kants Anwendung auf die Biologie läßt sich in sehr grober Kürze 
etwa auf folgende Weise deutlich machen. – Der lebende Körper ist ein Ganzes in der Natur.” 
46  Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie, 61.  “Die mechanische Erklärung, bei Kant die Erklärung schlechthin, ist 
nach seinem eigenen Zeugnis in den biologischen Wissenschaften unzulänglich....  Die moderne Forschung 
hat diese Unzulänglichkeit nunmehr auch für physikalische Probleme klar festgestellt.”  Horkheimer was 
not the only scholar interested in the issues raised for physics and physical explanation by the rise of 
holistic arguments in biology.  The quantum physicist Pascual Jordan pursued these problems during the 
1930s and 1940s in collaboration with the biological theorist Adolf Meyer-Abich.   
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only accrue to the unity that was originally present.”47  The young Horkheimer thus 
insists that the tenets of mechanistic materialism alone cannot facilitate an appropriate 
understanding of Kant’s philosophy or of biological thought and inquiry in general. 
In his 1925 Habilitationsschrift, On Kant’s Critique of Judgment as Bond 
Between Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Über Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als 
Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie), Horkheimer further 
elaborated his position.  In it he expanded his exploration of the valences of Kant’s 
discussion of teleological judgment to encompass Kant’s other major category of 
reflective judgment: the aesthetic.  Horkheimer analyzes the links between these two 
varieties of judgment around a distinction central to Gestalt thought: that between 
cognition and experience.  He further glosses the spheres of teleological and aesthetic 
judgment with the disciplinary terms ‘biology’ and ‘art.’ 
The Critique of Judgment divides into two parts – into the critiques of aesthetic 
and of teleological judgment. – The justice of this division, that is of the inclusion 
of two so heterogeneous cultural spheres as those represented by art and biology 
in the field of the activity of one and the same faculty – that of reflective 
judgment – may at first glance appear highly questionable....  According to the 
introductory statements about the function of the Critique of Judgment within the 
entirety of Kantian philosophy, the factual reason is easy to recognize: analysis of 
those unities that can be experienced, and the formation of which cannot be traced 
                                                 
47  Horkheimer, Zur Antinomie, 67.  “In der neuesten Philosophie trat der Kantischen Ansicht die Lehre von 
den Gestaltqualitäten gegenüber.  Sie besagt, daß ein Ganzes als solches Eigenschaften hat, die bei der 
Zerlegung in Teile verlorengehen, weil sie nur der Einheit zukommen, die ursprünglich vorlag.” 
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back to the exclusively aggregating function of the faculty of cognition, represents 
the function of the entire work.48 
Here Horkheimer emphasizes Kant’s argument that the cognitive faculties must approach 
living organisms and aesthetic objects by parallel means, because they both must be 
experienced rather than simply enumerated through observation.  This separates them 
from other fields of scholarly or scientific inquiry.49 
Horkheimer has here made the disciplinary language of Gestalt thought a less 
immediately present element of his argument than it was in his dissertation, but he retains 
his interest in the emergent qualities of living and aesthetic systems under human 
observation, and he continues to focus on Kant’s claims that mechanistic explanations are 
inadequate to life and art.  His summary comments on teleological judgment make this 
clear: 
The basic thesis of the Critique of Teleological Judgment which was to be 
analyzed here claims that: insofar as organic products of nature display 
characteristics that cannot be explained as “a product of the parts and their powers 
                                                 
48  Max Horkheimer, Über Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und 
praktischer Philosophie. Gesammelte Schriften 2 (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1987), 110.  “Die Kritik der 
Urteilskraft zerfällt in zwei Teile, in die Kritik der ästhetischen und diejenige der teleologischen 
Urteilskraft. – Die Rechtmäßigkeit dieser Einteilung, d.h. der Einbeziehung zweier so heterogener 
Kulturbereiche, wie Kunst und Biologie sie darstellen in das Feld der Betätigung eines und desselben 
Vermögens: der reflektierenden Urteilskraft, mag auf den ersten Blick höchst fraglich erscheinen....  Nach 
den einleitenden Ausführungen über die Funktion der Kritk der Urteilskraft im ganzen der Kantischen 
Philosophie ist der sachliche Grund der Einteilung leicht zu erkennen: Die Analyse derjenigen erfahrbaren 
Einheiten, deren Formung nicht auf die bloß aggregierende Funktion des Erkenntnisvermögens 
zurückzuführen ist, macht das Geschäft des ganzen Werkes aus.” 
49  A lecture by the young Adorno provides an interesting counterpoint to Horkheimer’s focus on 
teleological judgment.  Adorno, in a lecture entitled “The Idea of Natural History [Die Idee der 
Naturgeschichte]” that he gave to the Kant Society in Frankfurt am Main on 15 July 1932, develops a 
similar argument out of reflections on newer attempts to explain aesthetic phenomena.  He argues that in 
fact the traditional natural scientific concept of nature is empty.  Rather, he argues, all nature is history, and 
all history is nature.  He therefore demands a new form of “Naturgeschichte” as the form of inquiry 
commensurate to the complexities of the world.  He further argues that the kind of inquiry into aesthetic 
objects pioneered by Georg Lukács and Walter Benjamin points the way toward this new 
“Naturgeschichte,” because it is fully dialectical.  Theodor W. Adorno, “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte,” 
Gesammelte Schriften 1 [Philosophische Frühschriften] (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), 345-65. 
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and faculties of individual combination,” it is only possible for us to think of them 
as purposes....50 
Horkheimer thus develops Kant’s critique of Enlightenment materialism, with its wide-
ranging consequences for the disciplinary development of the biological sciences, into the 
basis for much of his own early work. 
Through the late 1920s and early 1930s, as he was developing the intellectual and 
institutional grounding for the Institut and the ZfS, Horkheimer sought to develop in his 
own work an independent understanding of materialism that sought to be philosophically 
and historically adequate to both the mechanistic and the dialectical valences of 
materialist thought.  Jay, in his reading of Horkheimer’s programmatic statement for the 
Institut, describes Horkheimer’s investigations of the relationship between materialism 
and scientific disciplinarity with reference to another term with important biological 
valences: ‘natural philosophy.’  Social philosophy (Sozialphilosophie), one of the early 
terms employed by Horkheimer to describe the work of the Institut, “was to be 
understood as a materialist theory enriched and supplemented by empirical work, in the 
same way that natural philosophy was dialectically related to individual scientific 
disciplines.”51  Horkheimer saw that empirical inquiry, whether in the social or the 
natural sciences, had a tendency to fragment into competing disciplines with vested 
interests in preventing communication and exchange.52  The Institut presented an 
                                                 
50  Horkheimer, Über Kants Kritik, 143.  “Die Grundthese der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, die 
hier zu untersuchen war, besagt: daß die organischen Naturprodukte, insofern sie Eigenschaften aufweisen, 
die nicht als ‘ein Produkt der Teile und ihrer Kräfte und Vermögen sich von selbst zu verbinden’... zu 
erklären sind, nur als Zweck für uns zu denken möglich seien....” 
51  Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 25.  Wiggershaus paraphrases Horkheimer’s argument this way: “The 
present state of knowledge requires a continuing fusion of philosophy and the various branches of science.” 
Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 38. 
52  Stephen Toulmin’s discussions of the problems of disciplinarity and their emergence from the historical 
disconnect between reason and reasonableness (a dichotomy he derives from his Wittgensteinian model of 
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opportunity for the development of a kind of critical, meta-disciplinary philosophy that 
could counteract the incentives to specialization and ideology construction that were 
endemic to academic institutions.  It therefore held the potential to enable a reconciliation 
of natural scientific method and philosophical argument.  Horkheimer imagined himself 
as the central node in this incipient institutional network of meta-disciplinary work.  
Helmut Dubiel thus describes Horkheimer’s program as one of a combination of research 
and ‘presentation’: 
The Institute’s program in the early 1930s consisted of “interdisciplinary” social 
research. [...] ...Horkheimer systematically claimed the function of presentation 
for himself, while his colleagues were assigned the role of providing material 
from the various disciplines.53 
The ZfS was to serve as the organ for this network. 
 
Materialism, Biology, and the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 
 
The founding of the ZfS represented an attempt to draw together these streams of 
argument and scholarship through a differentiated understanding of materialism into a 
productive synthesis of disciplinary inquiry, philosophical reflection, and engagement 
with social problems.  In the early years of the publication of the journal, especially 1932 
and 1933, Horkheimer and his colleagues believed that natural scientific inquiry, and 
especially that which had living systems as its object, remained fully within the intended 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument and inquiry) parallel and recapitulate central topoi of Horkheimer’s thought.  Toulmin does not 
explore Horkheimer or the Frankfurt School directly in his work, but the title of one of his recent books 
evokes Horkheimer almost uncannily.  Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 
53  Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 126-27. 
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purview of the journal’s program.54  Horkheimer’s editorial choices, as well as his own 
contributions to the ZfS, demonstrate this.  His short introductory essay in the first 
volume of the journal, entitled “Comments on Science and Crisis (Bemerkungen über 
Wissenschaft und Krise),” is suffused with language linking the concepts of Leben, 
Natur, Wissenschaft, and Gesellschaft.  The very first paragraph raises all of the valences 
of materialist understanding in one extended sentence about the relationship of science 
and society: 
It [science] makes the modern industrial system possible – as a condition, on 
average, of the mobility of thought that has developed with it in the past decades; 
further in the form of the simple insights about nature and the human world of 
which even the members of the lower social layers in advanced nations take 
notice; and not least as an element of the intellectual capital of the researchers, 
whose discoveries decidedly have a say in the form of social life.55 
Nature, human individuals, and societies together provide the basis for the knowledge 
that generates and mediates the economic system.  Horkheimer is fully aware, however, 
that similar arguments could be advanced by scholars and political figures with violently 
exclusionary, nationalist, and racist values.  He thus immediately insists that although 
scholarly inquiry remains an element within the historical and social world explored by 
                                                 
54  This is in marked contrast to Axel Honneth’s claim that “the entire edifice of interdisciplinary social 
science that Horkheimer attempted to sketch out during the 1930s rests upon the disciplines of economics 
and psychoanalysis alone.”  Axel Honneth, The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social 
Theory, trans. Kenneth Baynes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 30-31. 
55  Max Horkheimer, “Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 1 
(1932): 1.  “Als Bedingung der durchschnittlichen Beweglichkeit des Denkens, die sich in den letzten 
Jahrzehnten mit ihr entwickelt hat, ferner in Gestalt der einfachen Erkenntnisse über Natur und 
Menschenwelt, die in den fortgeschrittenen Ländern selbst die Angehörigen der unteren sozialen Schichten 
mitbekommen, nicht zuletzt als Bestandteil des geistigen Vermögens der Forscher, deren Entdeckungen die 
Form des gesellschaftlichen Lebens entscheidend mitbestimmen, ermöglicht sie [die Wissenschaft] das 
moderne Industriesystem.” 
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the Institut, it must be pursued independently from specific social and political interests.  
Furthermore, accessible and applicable standards of truth must guide such inquiry.  
Horkheimer only lightly veils his judgment of the claims of the politically active 
branches of biological thought like race biology and eugenics, for he engages their 
rhetoric of life process (Lebensprozeß) and necessity to life (Lebenswichtigkeit) just a few 
sentences later in the second paragraph of his essay: 
It in no way justifies a pragmatic theory of knowledge that science plays a role as 
a productive force and mode of production in the life process of society. [...]  The 
test of the truth of a judgment is something different from the test of its necessity 
to life.  No case exists where social interests must decide about truth.  Rather 
there are valid criteria that have developed in connection with the progress of 
theory.  Indeed science does itself change in the historical process, but never is a 
reference to this change an argument for the application of other criteria of truth 
than those that are adequate to the state of knowledge in the current stage of 
development.56 
Since this claim enables Horkheimer to set his project apart from immediate political 
goals, he can explore the valences of materialism with greater leeway.57  Thus in the 
remainder of his short essay he goes on first to dismiss mechanistic materialism, and then 
to highlight how economic conditions and scholarly institutions and explanations move in 
                                                 
56  Horkheimer, “Bemerkungen,” 1. “Daß die Wissenschaft als Produktivkraft und Produktionsmittel im 
Lebensprozeß der Gesellschaft eine Rolle spielt, berechtigt keineswegs eine pragmatische 
Erkenntnistheorie. [...]  Die Prüfung der Wahrheit eines Urteils ist etwas anderes als die Prüfung seiner 
Lebenswichtigkeit.  In keinem Fall haben gesellschaftliche Interessen über die Wahrheit zu entscheiden, 
sondern es gelten Kriterien, die sich im Zusammenhang mit dem theoretischen Fortschritt entwickelt haben.  
Zwar verändert sich die Wissenschaft selbst im geschichtlichen Prozeß, aber niemals ist der Hinweis auf 
diese Veränderung ein Argument für die Anwendung anderer Wahrheitskriterien als derjenigen, die dem 
Stand der Erkenntnis auf der erreichten Entwicklungsstufe angemessen sind.” 
57  Honneth refers to this aspect of Horkheimer’s arguments as evidence of a “sociological deficit.”  
Honneth, Critique of Power, 17. 
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parallel with one another, but must do so without the subordination of one to the other.  
He sums this idea up as follows: “The theory of the correlation of cultural disorder with 
economic conditions – and with the conflicts of interest that emerge from them – reveals 
nothing about the degree of reality or the hierarchical relationship of material and 
intellectual goods.”58  Horkheimer thus seeks means by which scholarly inquiry might be 
prevented from devolving into yet another form of ideology, and finds it, at least 
potentially, in an adequately sophisticated form of materialist thought.  He is already 
moving past the mechanistic-dialectical duality and toward the kind of multivalent, 
interdisciplinary materialism that will characterize his Critical Theory of the later 1930s. 
Horkheimer’s editorial policy in the first two years of the publication of the ZfS 
sought to expand the purview of its predecessor publication, Grünbergs Archiv, beyond 
the field of political economy.  The work of scholars like Friedrich Pollock, Kurt 
Baumann, and Henryk Grossmann helped the new journal retain its status as one of the 
foremost academic organs of Marxist-oriented economic thought.  Nonetheless the ZfS 
did have an extraordinarily broad purview.  Adorno published “On the Social Situation of 
Music (Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik);” Leo Lowenthal wrote similarly “On the 
Social Situation of Literature (Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur).”  Julian 
Gumperz analyzed the American political system.  Erich Fromm contributed three 
substantial articles on psychoanalysis and social psychology.  Each of the first two 
volumes of the journal also contained one article that focused particularly on the natural 
scientific and biological embranchments of materialist thought.  Both of these articles 
highlighted the issue of the ideological loading of scientific inquiry through too great an 
                                                 
58  Horkheimer,”Bemerkungen,” 6-7.  “Die Lehre vom Zusammenhang der kulturellen Unordnung mit den 
ökonomischen Verhältnissen und den aus ihnen sich ergebenden Interessengegensätzen besagt nichts über 
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emphasis on mechanistic or deterministic claims to total explanation of natural 
phenomena. 
The first volume of the ZfS contained a contribution by the Vienna sociologist 
Franz Borkenau entitled “On the Sociology of the Mechanistic Representation of the 
World (Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen Weltbildes).”  Borkenau saw the proliferation 
of a “mathematical-mechanistic representation of the world (mathematisch-
mechanistisches Weltbild)” after 1620 as a thoroughgoing shift in European thought.  In 
Borkenau’s view, the influence of Descartes, Hobbes, and Gassendi led to complete 
dominance of theories of knowledge by mathematically elaborated mechanistic models.  
He further emphasizes that this development suffused both physical explanation and 
social theory, and revealed their unity at the time: “In the origination process of modern 
thought there exists – in the sharpest contrast to its further formation – no boundary 
between metaphysics and the theory of knowledge on the once hand, and physics and 
social theory on the other.”59  This unity drove the rapid development of industrial 
manufacture.  Nonetheless it also rapidly developed ideological character, and Borkenau 
discusses the work of numerous thinkers including Althusius, Lipsius, and Hobbes as 
ideologies.  Interestingly, Borkenau does not describe what he sees as Pascal’s 
“pessimistic” system of “negative dialectics [negative Dialektik]” as ideological.  This is 
because Pascal, despite being rooted in the social structures of his day, developed a new 
approach to scientific inquiry: “He first subordinated, with extreme rigor, the formulation 
                                                 
59  Franz Borkenau, “Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen Weltbildes,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 1 
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of natural laws to verification by experiment....”60  Pascal provides a necessary part of the 
foundation for the kind of autonomously systematic and empirically rigorous inquiry into 
natural and human phenomena to which materialist social research still aspires.  
Borkenau thus establishes that mechanistic explanation, though inadequate as a theory of 
knowledge, remains within the sphere of social research because it has accreted durable 
social functions. 
In the second volume of the ZfS, Paul Ludwig Landsberg contributed an article 
that made clear the importance of a well argued response by materialist social theory to 
one widely known but particularly problematical sphere of biological thought: race 
theory.  Landsberg’s title pulled no punches about the fundamental issue involved: “Race 
Ideology and Race Science (Rassenideologie und Rassenwissenschaft).”  Landsberg 
develops his argument in the spirit of Horkheimer’s claims that despite the present danger 
of ideological misrepresentation and misuse of the results of scholarly inquiry, such 
inquiry can and must still aspire to truth.  Furthermore, ideology itself clearly reveals the 
socially embedded character of all knowledge, and therefore must be drawn into methods 
of inquiry that seek knowledge as social truth.  Landsberg thus draws a clear conceptual 
distinction between science and ideology, but refuses to dismiss ideology as purely false 
or manipulative: 
It is of the greatest importance to differentiate in principle between race theory as 
pure ideology and race theory as natural science.  The sense in which the 
questions of bourgeois natural science are not free from a guiding ideological 
motive will be demonstrated, but also that the widest possible difference exists 
                                                 
60  Borkenau, “Zur Soziologie,” 335.  “Er [Pascal] als erster hat mit äußerster Strenge die Formulierung von 
Naturgesetzen der Verifizierung durch das Experiment untergeordnet....” 
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between those questions and actual race ideologies.  As regards the concept of 
ideology, we are far from making the ideologue equivalent to the fraud.  The fact 
that a theory can be designated an ideology indicates that both its origin and its 
evidence are not based, for its adherents, on experiential content, but on a social 
function, on an effect within society and its conflicts that is expected of it.61 
The problem of the scientific and ideological use and misuse of the race concept also 
points directly to the mutual implication of biological and sociological inquiry.  
Landsberg argues that biology has in fact provided the foundation for important 
developments in both sociology and philosophy: 
The tremendous development of modern biology raised the problems of race with 
new urgency, because it placed biological questions at the center even of 
sociological discussion.  In philosophy since Nietzsche it gave occasion to the 
formation of biocentric representations of the world that have widely divergent 
value, and of which the most important are that of Bergson, and at some interval 
of niveau that of Klages.62 
Landsberg’s conclusions about race biology develop the principles of Horkheimer’s 
materialist social research into a detailed case study of a field in which the common 
                                                 
61  Paul Ludwig Landsberg. “Rassenideologie und Rassenwissenschaft: Zur neuesten Literatur über das 
Rassenproblem,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 2 (1933): 388.  “Es ist von grösster Wichtigkeit, prinzipiell 
zu unterscheiden: Rassenlehre als pure Ideologie und Rassenlehre als Naturwissenschaft.  In welchem 
Sinne auch die Fragen der bürgerlichen Naturwissenschaft von einem leitenden ideologischen Motiv nicht 
frei sind, wird zu zeigen sein, aber auch, dass zwischen ihnen und den eigentlichen Rasseideologien ein 
himmelweiter Unterschied besteht.  Was den Begriff der Ideologie anlangt, so liegt es uns fern, den 
Ideologen etwa mit dem Betrüger gleich zu setzen.  Dass eine Lehre als Ideologie zu bezeichnen ist, sagt 
aus, dass sie sowohl ihre Entstehung, wie ihre Evidenz für ihre Anhänger im Wesentlichen nicht einem 
Erfahrungsinhalt verdankt, sondern einer sozialen Funktion, einer Auswirkung in der Gesellschaft und 
ihren Kämpfen, welche von ihr erwartet wird.” 
62  Landsberg,  “Rassenideologie und Rassenwissenschaft,” 403.  “Da die gewaltige Entfaltung der 
modernen Biologie biologische Fragen in das Zentrum auch der soziologischen Diskussion stellte und in 
der Philosophie seit Nietzsche Anlass gab zur Herausbildung biozentrischer Weltbilder von sehr 
verschiedenem Wert, deren bedeutendste das von Bergson und in einigem Niveauabstand das von Klages 
sind, stellte sie die Probleme der Rasse in neuer Dringlichkeit auf.” 
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historical and social roots of science, ideology and politics become particularly clear, and 
which therefore provides at once a great challenge to and a powerful motivation for the 
development of the methods and goals of the Institut and the ZfS. 
Horkheimer himself chose a more philosophical approach to questions of 
scholarly inquiry and social conflict in his fully developed scholarly contributions to the 
early volumes of the ZfS.  In two essays published in the second volume of the journal he 
thoroughly explored the concept of materialism, and staked his claim to scholarship that 
could be fully adequate to the political and social problems of the day.   In “Materialism 
and Metaphysics,” the lead article in volume two of the ZfS, Horkheimer develops most 
systematically his argument that the mechanistic and dialectical valences of materialism 
are in fact part of the same historical process, and thus must contribute together to a 
productive system of inquiry that can advance the understanding of the world.  
Furthermore, the identity of the two valences of materialism reveals historically and 
demands methodologically that natural scientific and philosophical work be pursued with 
unitary purpose.  He begins with an argument that even opponents of materialism often 
accept for its means of linking a unitary view of the world with the practical 
consequences of human action: 
Even if materialism appears so insufficient in contrast to other possible 
summations of the whole of the world, its most general thesis – the one that 
concerns the world in and of itself – is also taken up in combat against it as 
fundamental for specific practical consequences, and so too for a unitary formal 
arrangement of life....63 
                                                 
63  Max Horkheimer, “Materialismus und Metaphysik,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 2 (1933): 7.  “Mag 
der Materialismus gegenuber den anderen möglichen Auffassungen vom Weltganzen als noch so 
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He goes on to clarify the historical and intellectual roots of the apparent, but 
philosophically meaningless, divide between the mechanistic and dialectical forms of 
materialist thought.  Martin Jay’s reading of this essay, which he calls “one of his 
[Horkheimer’s] most important in the Zeitschrift,” focuses on how Horkheimer critiques 
both “mechanical materialists” and “the putative materialism of orthodox Marxism.”64  
Horkheimer develops his argument out of a claim that both Kant and Hegel attempted to 
avoid materialist terms in the construction of their idealistic systems, but how both 
thereby in fact further developed the grounding for materialism.  He then sums up the 
historical and philosophical result of these developments of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries in one of his most famously unambiguous and widely quoted 
phrases: “Materialism demands the unification of philosophy and science.”65 
 The final third of Horkheimer’s essay must therefore address how and why his 
multivalent materialism provides superior means of explanation to other synthetic modes 
of inquiry.  The other modes that challenge Horkheimer’s vision have a common thread, 
as well.  They are all biological.  They thus claim to provide total explanations of life, its 
determinants, and its consequences.  He begins with the best known philosophical system 
promulgated by a practicing academic biologist: Ernst Haeckel’s monism. 
Because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all of science rested upon the 
mechanical theory of nature, and almost exhausted itself in it, the materialism of 
the time allowed as valid knowledge of reality only mathematical-mechanical 
                                                                                                                                                 
unzulänglich erscheinen, seine allgemeinste, die Welt überhaupt betreffende These wird auch im Kampfe 
gegen ihn als grundlegend für bestimmete praktische Konsequenzen, ja für eine einheitliche 
Lebensgestaltung genommen....” 
64  Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 53. 
65  Horkheimer, “Materialismus und Metaphysik,” 23.  “Der Materialismus fordert die Vereinigung von 
Philosophe und Wissenschaft.” 
   
 30
natural science. [...]  The physical materialism of Vogt and Haeckel in the 
nineteenth century had already practically given up striving for the unification of 
philosophy and positive science, because in their time the mechanical theory of 
nature in no way coincided any longer with the content of science, but had, rather, 
lost significant contemporary meaning in relation to the social sciences.  They had 
also become decisive for methodology.  The purely natural scientific monism of 
Haeckel is therefore a pseudo-materialism, which also announces itself in its 
function, by means of world-view, of distracting from historical praxis.66 
Nineteenth century positivism, including the forms pursued by Comte and Mach, reveals 
a similar failing: it refuses to recognize any historicity in the processes of scientific 
inquiry.  Positivism also, through its refusal to seek more than only explanations for the 
observable appearances of natural and living phenomena, has no answer to superstitions 
or to metaphysical and vitalistic speculations about souls and life forces. 
In Horkheimer’s opinion, the two most widely read scholarly partisans of 
biologistic philosophical thought after 1900, Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, lost 
themselves entirely in the thickets of positivism’s failures.  Bergson’s ‘élan vital’ and 
Driesch’s extensively elaborated arguments for a vitalistic force guiding the development 
of living organisms are thus both attempts to answer the unanswerable pseudo-problems 
                                                 
66  Horkheimer, “Materialismus und Metaphysik,” 23-24.  “Weil im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert die gesamte 
Wissenschaft auf der mechanischen Naturlehre beruhte, ja sich fast in ihr erschöpfte, ließ der damalige 
Materialismus als einziges Wissen von der Wirklichkeit die mathematisch-mechanische Naturwissenschaft 
gelten. [...]  Schon der physikalische Materialismus der Vogt und Haeckel im 19. Jahrhundert hat jedoch 
das Bestreben, Philosophie und positive Wissenschaft zu vereinigen, praktisch aufgegeben, indem zu ihrer 
Zeit die mechanische Naturlehre keineswegs mehr mit dem Inhalt der Wissenschaft zusammenfiel, sondern 
gegenüber den Gesellschaftswissenschaften stark an aktueller Bedeutung verloren hatte.  Sie wurden nun 
auch für die Methodologie entscheidend.  Der haeckelsche rein naturwissenschaftliche Monismus ist daher 
ein Pseudo-Materialismus, was sich auch in seiner weltanschaulichen, von der geschichtlichen Praxis 
ablenkenden Funktion kundgibt.” 
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of positivism.67  It comes as no surprise to Horkheimer that both Bergson and Driesch 
(and even Comte before them) wound up tilting at spiritualistic and occult phenomena 
and explanations.68  Horkheimer’s conclusion is unambiguous.  “Neither ‘the mystical’ 
nor the ‘meaning of life’ exists.”69  He thus concludes that his multivalent materialism 
more successfully addresses the full range of human phenomena and interests than its 
biologically justified predecessors, because only it develops clear intellectual and 
methodological means of explaining together both the physical and the economic aspects 
of human life in their historical and present manifestations.  His second essay in the 
second volume of the ZfS, on “Materialism and the Moral (Materialismus und Moral),” 
further develops his arguments by exploring their consequences for the ethical judgment 
of human action. 
 
Richard Thurnwald and the Biology of Society 
 
Despite the interests in sophisticated explanations of social phenomena that 
Horkheimer and Thurnwald had come to share by 1931, their personal histories and 
processes of intellectual development were very different.  Thurnwald achieved his 
academic position, as professor of ethnology in Berlin, only circuitously.  Thurnwald’s 
early history, in fact, seems ready-made to have given him little tolerance for the opinions 
of a young and ambitious left-oriented academic like Horkheimer.  Born in 1869 in 
Vienna, Thurnwald grew up in bourgeois surroundings, served for some time in the 
                                                 
67  Bloch and Lukács expand this critique, especially in relation to Bergson’s “attack on objectivity and 
scienticity” [Lukács].  Lukács, Zerstörung, 27-35.  Bloch, Materialismusproblem, 278-82. 
68  Horkheimer, “Materialismus und Metaphysik,” 28-29. 
69  Horkheimer, “Materialismus und Metaphysik,” 29.  “Es gibt weder ‘das Mystische’, noch den ‘Sinn des 
Lebens.’” 
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imperial Austro-Hungarian army, and earned a degree in law in 1895.  As a civil servant 
in Graz he met the sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz, who awakened his interest in 
research on human societies.  In 1900 he moved to Berlin to resume studies at the 
university on ethnological topics.  In 1901 he met Felix von Luschan, the director of the 
Berlin Museum of Ethnology.  By November of that year he had published his first 
scholarly article on ancient Egypt, and had been appointed to a research assistantship at 
the museum.70 
Through his interest in the anti-alcohol movement, Thurnwald came into close 
contact and association with a group of scholars and advocates who contributed more 
than any other to the propagation of principles of race hygiene and eugenics in Germany.  
The leading figure in the group was Alfred Ploetz, and together with Ernst Rüdin and 
Anastasius Nordenholz, Ploetz and Thurnwald founded both the journal known as the 
Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie (Archive for the Biology of Race and 
Society; in 1904) and the Society for Race Hygiene (Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene; in 
1905).  Thurnwald contributed several articles to the early volumes of the journal, and 
remained on its editorial board into the 1920s.71  He would later reject many of the 
principles of race hygiene that the Archiv and the Gesellschaft had been instrumental in 
propagating, but only after years of further study and his development, through years of 
field research, into one of the founders of German field ethnology.72  In September 1906, 
Thurnwald began his first ethnological research trip under the auspices of the Berlin 
                                                 
70  Marion Melk-Koch, Auf der Suche nach der menschlichen Gesellschaft: Richard Thurnwald (Berlin: 
Museum für Völkerkunde; Dietrich Reimer, 1989), 13-30. 
71  For the most extensive of the many treatments of German race biology see: Paul Weindling, Health, 
Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism 1870-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1989).  Weindling unfortunately misses Thurnwald’s intellectual developments in the 1920s, 
incorrectly lumping him with the Nazi race theorists who had also earlier contributed to the development of 
the Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie.   
72  Melk-Koch, Auf der Suche,  30-48. 
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museum, and it took him to a place he would spend many years: New Guinea.  This first 
journey, which also took him to Bougainville, pursued the collection of material objects 
for the museum in Berlin.  It lasted until September 1909, and included a visit to the 
United States on the return trip to Germany. 
By 1910, Thurnwald was questioning Luschan’s insistence on the systematic 
collection of the objects of material culture as the museum’s main scientific pursuit, and 
began planning another lengthy research trip to begin exploring methods of research 
which could better explore the broad determinants of the social aspects of informant 
groups through participatory methods of observation.73  In 1911 he gave a number of 
major lectures at conferences that explained his new methodological ideas.  In them he 
extensively developed his claim that complex socio-cultural phenomena must be explored 
as manifestations of historically rooted psychologies that have biological determinants.  
At the first meeting of the International Organization for Comparative Law and 
Economics (Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und 
Volkswirtschaftslehre), he phrased it this way: 
It appears to me to be generally more important, and at the same time more 
practically productive, to ask after the branching geographical, biological, and 
economic conditions for the formation of a specific mode of thought and the 
conventions and institutions that accrete to it, and then to approach the basic 
problems of ethnographic studies from this side.74 
                                                 
73  Melk-Koch discusses at length Thurnwald’s thoughts about ethnological methods, and the conflicts with 
Luschan that resulted from them.  Melk-Koch, Auf der Suche, 76-91, 114-24,  
74  Quoted in: Melk-Koch, Auf der Suche, 137.  “Allgemein wichtiger und zugleich praktisch 
fruchtbringender scheint es mir zu sein, nach den verzweigten geographischen, biologischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen für die Gestaltung einer bestimmten Denkart und daran sich knüpfende 
Gewohnheiten und Einrichtungen zu fragen und von dieser Seite her an die Grundprobleme der 
ethnologischen Studien heranzutreten.”  Emphasis original. 
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At the 83rd meeting of the Association of German Naturalists and Physicians 
(Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte) in Karlsruhe, he emphasized the 
biological element in his methods.  He sought, “on the basis of biology,... to grasp 
cultural inquiry with the natural-scientific spirit of exact psychology.”75  He embarked on 
his second research journey in December 1912, and he would not return to Berlin until 
May 1917, after adventures including an English-Australian navy campaign against his 
‘position’ in New Guinea in early 1915 and over a year as a guest researcher at the 
University of California in Berkeley during 1916 and 1917.  1918 saw Thurnwald 
fighting for several months on the Western Front in France. 
In 1919, in view of his numerous and well-respected publications, the University 
of Halle granted him the Habilitation in ethnology.  In 1922 he received a second 
Habilitation from Berlin, where he was able to continue his career after 1923.  In 1925 he 
was given the honorary title of professor, but without a civil service salary or chair as 
Ordinarius.  In this period he worked with numerous journals, published widely, and 
served as the founding editor of the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie, 
which was published from 1925 to 1933 under his leadership.76  In his programmatic lead 
article in the first volume of the journal Thurnwald returned to the language of his 1911 
lectures, and emphasized the complex disciplinary status and structure of his scholarly 
goals in a way that would have been familiar to Horkheimer.  Biology once again arose 
as a significant moment of disciplinary overlap: 
                                                 
75  Quoted in: Melk-Koch, Auf der Suche, 138.  “...auf den Grundlagen der Biologie… die Kulturkunde mit 
dem naturwissenschaftlich exact-psychologischen Geiste zu erfassen.”  Emphasis original. 
76  Ute Michel discusses the difficult financial and administrative circumstances of the publication of the 
ZVS (and other journals) in this period.  Ute Michel, “Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann (1904-1988) – ein 
deutscher Professor.  Amnesie und Amnestie: Zum Verhältnis von Ethnologie und Politik im 
Nationalsozialismus,” Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte 1991: 75. 
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Social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) and sociology are concepts contested in 
their meaning and interpretation.  In any case, there are other areas of knowledge 
that are already valued today as recognized and settled in which concepts are not 
sharply bounded.  In geography and biology, and fully in political economy 
(Nationalökonomie), the boundary regions take up broad swaths, even when it is 
specifically in these disciplines that the nucleus has clearly crystallized.77 
Thurnwald’s chosen disciplinary designations have a much in common with 
Horkheimer’s multivalent materialism.  The one element they do not share is 
Horkheimer’s interest in the philosophical grounding of disciplinary inquiry.  They did 
share a sense that their careers were stagnating in the atmosphere of economic, political, 
and academic crisis in early 1930s Germany, and sought opportunities to expand their 
activities beyond German borders.  In 1930 and 1931 Thurnwald pursued further field 
research in Africa.  In 1931-32 he was visiting professor at Yale.  After a year in a cabin 
in the Adirondacks, a further research trip to New Guinea, six months in Australia, a 
short return to Berlin, and another year (1935-36) at Yale, Thurnwald found himself with 
no choice but to return to Berlin, for at age 67 he was too old to hold an American 
professorship during an economic depression and in an age of mandatory retirement laws.  
After years of deprivation during the war, he was made Ordinarius at the refounded 
Humboldt-Universität in July 1946.  He had little patience with academic life in the 
                                                 
77  Richard Thurnwald, “Probleme der Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie,” Zeitschrift für 
Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie 1.1 (1925): 1.  ‘Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie sind in ihrer 
Bedeutung und Deutung umstrittene Ausdrücke.  Allerdings sind die Begriffe in anderen heute schon als 
anerkannt und eingesessen geltenden Wissensgebieten auch nicht immer scharf umgrenzt.  In der 
Geographie oder in der Biologie, vollends in der Nationalökonomie, nehmen die Grenzgebiete breite 
Streifen ein, wenn gleich in diesen Disziplinen der Kern schon deutlich auskristallisiert ist.” 
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Soviet zone of occupation, however, and participated in the founding of the Freie 
Universität Berlin in 1948.  He died in 1954. 
Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, Thurnwald’s student and the managing editor of 
Sociologus/ZVS in the period of the disagreement with Horkheimer, also had a colorful 
career.  Mühlmann, like Thurnwald, started his career in eugenic and race biology circles, 
and had been a student not only of Thurnwald but also of three of the leading luminaries 
of German race science in the 1920s and 1930s: Eugen Fischer, the investigator of race 
mixing in German South-West Africa, in Freiburg and Berlin; Walter Scheidt, the 
partisan of “cultural biology (Kulturbiologie),” in Hamburg; and Fritz Lenz, the (first-
ever) professor of race hygiene and propagandist of racial ‘values’ in Munich.78  During 
the Nazi period Mühlmann participated in several Nazi ethnographic and sociological 
research initiatives in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union.  Nonetheless he was 
denazified without difficulty after the war, and went on to professorships in Mainz and 
Heidelberg, where he became the focus of controversy in the late 1960s for his 
complicity in Nazi race research.79 
 
Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and the Biological Politics of Social Research 
 
The problem of the disciplinary status of biology in social research was the 
intellectual issue at the core of the conflict between Horkheimer and Thurnwald.  Two 
                                                 
78  Michel, “Mühlmann,” 72-3.  Mühlmann explains his personal history, his investment in the concepts and 
goals of race biology and race hygiene, and his association with and respect for Fischer, in a lengthy 
handwritten letter to Thurnwald dated 2 April 1932.  Thurnwald and Fischer themselves enjoyed a collegial 
working relationship, and the Thurnwald Papers include a number of friendly letters between them from 
this period.  Richard Christian Thurnwald Papers, Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library.  All quoted letters are from this collection unless otherwise noted. 
79  On the 1960s controversy about Mühlmann’s complicity in Nazi research see also: Michael Kater, “The 
Myth of Myths: Scholarship and Teaching in Heidelberg,” Central European History 36 (2003): 573. 
   
 37
moments of institutional friction with personal consequences sparked it, however.  The 
first of these was the competition that the ZfS presented to Sociologus/ZVS.  By January 
1933 Sociologus/ZVS had German, American, English, and Dutch sociologists, 
anthropologists, and biologists on its editorial board, including Friedrich Alverdes, 
Edward Sapir, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Pitirim Sorokin.80  It was therefore similar to 
the ZfS in its claims to international, cross- and interdisciplinary interests.  The ZfS and 
Sociologus/ZVS further shared the same publisher, C. L. Hirschfeld in Leipzig, which 
intensified Thurnwald’s and Mühlmann’s concerns that the ZfS represented competition 
to their journal rather than a mutually reinforcing enterprise.  The second reason for 
Thurnwald’s skepticism toward Horkheimer was the association of the Institut and its 
forms of materialist thought and theory with Marxism, which Thurnwald treated with 
generalized scorn.  Thurnwald’s association with race biology and eugenics had colored 
his early politics, but by the early 1930s he had found his way to a kind of liberal 
internationalism.  Both Thurnwald and Mühlmann regarded Horkheimer as an 
opportunist.  Nonetheless their own academic relationship was not without sources of 
conflict.  Their mutual criticism of Horkheimer’s goals and politics between 1931 and 
1933 ignited a series of their own personal and academic disagreements over the 
intellectual and scientific status of race biology that further demonstrates how the 
disciplinary instability of biology made itself felt in many areas of social research. 
The initial document of the interaction between Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and 
Mühlmann gives evidence of how Horkheimer himself highlighted the interdisciplinary 
                                                 
80  In his position on the editorial board of Sociologus, Alverdes, who was Professor of Zoology at 
Marburg, provides a direct link between the interdisciplinary socio-anthropology of Thurnwald and the new 
directions in holistic organismal and environmental biology being pursued by Adolf Meyer-Abich, Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy, Hans Driesch, and Jakob von Uexküll. 
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nature of his plans for the ZfS to other scholars.  This document is a letter from 
Mühlmann (in Berlin) to Thurnwald (in New Haven), dated 30 October 1931.  In it, 
Mühlmann recounts receiving a first letter from Horkheimer a few days before in which 
Horkheimer, apparently in Berlin at the time, asked to see Thurnwald.81  Upon learning 
that this was impossible, Horkheimer spoke at length with Mühlmann, apparently in 
person, about his plans.  Mühlmann describes Horkheimer’s presentation of his plans for 
the ZfS as follows: 
At that point I gave him an interview, in which I learned the following: the 
aforementioned Frankfurt institute plans to publish an (institutional) journal, 
“Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,” that is supposed to appear first at the beginning 
of next year.  It is supposed to make political economy (Nationalökonomie), 
biology, psychology, social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) “fruitful” for social 
research (Sozialforschung).  The reason that Herr Prof. Horkheimer imparted 
these things to me was, firstly, that he – as he expressed it to me – felt the need to 
discuss the planned founding [of the journal] with a specialist; for twenty minutes 
he took me for your temporary replacement at the university.  Secondly, the 
gentleman wanted our and your help.82 
Horkheimer thus raises the same set of mediating disciplines, psychology and biology, 
that linked his concept of Sozialforschung as multivalent materialism to other academic 
                                                 
81  This first letter from Horkheimer is not extant in the Thurnwald papers, nor does it appear in the finding 
aids or indices of the Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main. 
82  Mühlmann to Thurnwald, 30 October 1931, 2.  “Ich gab ihm darauf ein Interview, auf dem ich folgendes 
erfuhr: Das erwähnte Frankfurter Institut plant die Herausgabe einer (Instituts-) Zeitschrift, ‘Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung’, die ab Anfang nächsten Jahres erscheinen soll.  Sie soll Nationalökonomie, Biologie, 
Psychologie, Völkerpsychologie für die Sozialforschung ‘fruchtbar’ machen....  Der Grund dafür, dass Herr 
Prof. Horkheimer mir diese Dinge mitteilte, war einmal der, dass er, wie er sich ausdrückte, das Bedürfnis 
habe, sich mit einem Fachmann über die geplante Neugründung auszusprechen; er hielt mich nämlich 
zwanzig Minuten lang für Ihren Vertrter an der Universität.  Zweitens aber wünschte der Herr unsere und 
Ihre Hilfe.” 
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structures – and were also precisely those boundary disciplines with which Thurnwald 
was most concerned.  Mühlmann was distinctly skeptical of Horkheimer’s intent, 
immediately scoffing that: “All of it was a completely clumsy attempt to lead me on, and 
still today I am shocked that one takes us for so boundlessly stupid as to work for the 
competition.”83  Mühlmann further indicates that Horkheimer sent him a letter of 
confirmation of their discussion, on ZfS letterhead.  Thurnwald wrote back to Mühlmann 
on 14 November 1931 with a somewhat more sanguine opinion of Horkheimer’s intent, 
indicating that he considered Horkheimer’s intentions to be just another example of 
misplaced “industriousness (Betriebsamkeit).”84  These two letters further demonstrate 
how Thurnwald and Mühlmann approached biology as a foundational disciplinary 
element in sociology, for they discuss at some length the idea of including a section of 
book reviews in the December issue of Sociologus/ZVS under the rubric “Biological 
Foundations of Sociology (Biologische Grundlagen der Soziologie).” 
 Mühlmann’s next letter to Thurnwald, dated 29 November 1931, is an important 
document of the biologically structured thought of a major young ethnologist of the 
period.  Mühlmann and Thurnwald thought similarly about many things, but Mühlmann, 
though he was younger, saw race as a much more significant category of inquiry than did 
Thurnwald.  In his letter, Mühlmann writes at length about why he is less skeptical of 
“value theory (Werttheorie)” than Thurnwald, and why he sees Darwinism as the grounds 
for arguments that evolutionary claims about human diversity can justify theories of 
                                                 
83  Mühlmann to Thurnwald, 30 October 1931, 2.  “Das Ganze war ein überaus plumper Versuch, mich 
auszuholen, und ich bin noch heute erschrocken darüber, dass man uns für so masslos dumm hält, für die 
Konkurrenz zu arbeiten.” 
84  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 14 November 1931, 2. 
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value.85  In doing so he raises a category that was also fundamental to Horkheimer and 
his Institut colleagues at this point, and thus further helps to explain why Thurnwald and 
Mühlmann were resistant to Horkheimer’s arguments: Praxis.  Mühlmann reminds 
Thurnwald that: 
You yourself want to reach out from sociology into praxis.  Praxis, however, is 
decidedly not self-evident. [...]  For my part, therefore, praxis is so entirely not 
self-evident because my thought is decisively determined by racial hygiene; and 
in the light of racial hygiene some measure of today’s praxis, for example in 
social welfare, appears considerably questionable.86 
Mühlmann thus reveals that his primary intellectual allegiance is to his training in race 
biology and race hygiene. 
Thurnwald responded on 21 December 1931 with a lengthy discussion of his 
hard-earned skepticism about race biology.  He himself had been a major figure in early 
German race biology and eugenics, but he had become publicly critical of their methods 
and goals after the First World War.  By 1925, Thurnwald believed that race biology was 
an inadequate means of understanding human diversity.  He had come to see the field’s 
vulgar evolutionism as conflating culture and taxonomy through the loose concept of 
race.  Thurnwald extensively critiqued race biology in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
developed a theory of sifting (Siebung) as a counterpoint to what he saw to be all-too-
loose analogies to Darwinian selection in the race biologists’ approach to processes of 
                                                 
85  Here Mühlmann is recapitulating the vocabulary of his teacher Fritz Lenz, which is found most 
dramatically in: Fritz Lenz, Die Rasse als Wertprizip: Zur Erneuerung der Ethik (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns 
Verlag, 1933).  An earlier version of Lenz’s essay was published in Deutschlands Erneuerung in 1917. 
86  Mühlmann to Thurnwald, 29 November 1931, 2.  “Sie wollen ja doch selber von der Soziologie in die 
Praxis ausgreifen.  Praxis aber ist doch nichts Selbstverständliches. [...]  Für mich selber ist Praxis darum so 
ganz und garnichts Selbstverständliches, weil mein Denken entscheidend von der Rassenhygiene her 
bestimmt ist; und im Lichte der Rassenhygiene erscheint mancherlei Praxis von heute, z. B. in der sozialen 
Fürsorge, in bedeutender Fragwürdigkeit.” 
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cultural change.  In 1924 he published a lengthy article entitled “On the Critique of the 
Biology of Society (Zur Kritik der Gesellschaftsbiologie)” in Werner Sombart’s Archiv 
für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for Social Science and Social Policy).87  
Thurnwald believed that biological phenomena were of crucial importance to 
ethnological and sociological methods, but he insisted in this article that the latter fields 
must not be collapsed into biology through all-too-facile borrowing: 
Several concepts that recur in discussions of the biology of society deserve to be 
thought through critically.  In many cases these concepts have been transferred 
from zoology or biology onto human conditions of sociability.  Such carryover of 
a concept from one area of application to another brings easily with it, however, 
displacement of relationships, lack of clarity, and then failure of communication 
in discussion.88 
This personal history of increasing distance to the claims of race biology colors his 
response to Mühlmann: 
Now then, as regards your assertions about values, I set myself against that 
“overvaluing” of values that has become common in Germany….  I know that 
strict “objectivity” is not possible, least of all in the sociological field.  But there 
are levels and degrees of subjectivity. […]  As regards racial hygiene, you 
                                                 
87  The article is organized into five sections, each of which addresses and critiques a central concept in race 
biology: Rasse, Degeneration, Siebung [sifting – this is Thurnwald’s theoretical replacement for Darwinian 
‘selection’], Völkertod [race death], and Tüchtigkeit [fitness – another Darwinian term of which Thurnwald 
is critical].  Thurnwald also published articles on “Rasse,” “Rassenfrage,” “Rassenhygiene,” and 
“Rassenkampf” in: Paul Herre, ed., Politisches Handwörterbuch, vol. 2 (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1923), 
403-409. 
88  Richard Thurnwald, “Zur Kritik der Gesellschaftsbiologie,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik 52.1 (1924): 462.  “Einige Begriffe, die in den gesellschaftsbiologischen Erörterungen 
wiederkehren, verdienen einmal kritisch durchdacht zu werden.  Vielfach sind diese Begriffe aus der 
Zoologie oder Biologie auf menschliche Zustände der Gesellung übertragen worden.  Eine solche 
Ueberführung eines Begriffs aus einem Anwendungsgebiet auf ein anderes bringt aber leicht eine 
Verschiebung der Beziehungen, Unklarheit, und dann ein Vorbeireden in den Erörterungen mit sich.” 
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probably know that I too came through this childhood disease.  Most race 
hygienists are however, as you yourself insinuate, so divorced from society, and 
therefore so divorced from life, that one would like to weep.89 
Thurnwald goes on to discuss at length the potential misunderstandings that arise because 
sociology and biology can make use of the same terms of analysis.  He specifically 
explains to Mühlmann how this problem affects his use of the term Siebung, and further 
why he expressly avoids the term Rasse: “Should you address the confusion in thought 
that is bound up with the word ‘race,’ then that will all be very nice.  But specifically 
because great confusion reigns, I chose a different expression.”90  For Thurnwald in 1931, 
race is no longer a term that has useful explanatory content either in sociology or in 
biology. 
 In early 1932, Horkheimer and the ZfS again appear in the correspondence, and 
biology is again the moment of contention.  On 20 February 1932, Mühlmann reported 
receiving the publisher’s prospectus for the ZfS:  
The enclosed prospectus from our “competition” will interest you.  The first 
volume has not yet been published.  I have to write the publisher a few stern 
words about this, its newest child, especially since I bugled the charge so 
powerfully in the autumn.  The preface represents approximately the things that 
Prof. Horkheimer brought to my attention at the time.  At that time, however, he 
                                                 
89  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 21 December 1931, 2-3.  “Was nun ihre Ausführungen über die Werte 
anbelangt, so wende ich mich gegen die in Deutschland üblich gewordene ‘Überbewertung’ der Werte....  
Ich weiss, dass strenge ‘Objektivität’ nicht möglich ist, am wenigsten auf soziologischem Gebiet.  Aber es 
giebt Stufen und Grade von Subjektivität. [...]  Was die Rassenhygiene anbelangt, so wissen Sie 
wahrscheinlich, dass ich diese Kinderkrankheit auch durchgemacht habe.  Die meisten Rassenhygieniker 
sind aber, wie Sie selbst andeuten, so gesellschatsfremd und damit lebensfremd, dass man weinen möchte.” 
Emphasis original. 
90  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 21 December 1931, 4.  “Wenn Sie sich mit der gedanklichen Verwirrung, die 
mit dem Wort ‘Rasse’ verbunden ist, befassen, so wird das sehr schön sein.  Eben deswegen aber, weil 
grosse Unklarheit herrscht, wählte ich einen anderen Ausdruck.” 
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spoke of “making fruitful” economics, history, psychology, and biology.  This 
time biology is missing!  That proves to me that Mr. Horkheimer came to me then 
with quite specific and individually tailored intentions.  “Biology” was supposed 
to be bait that would get me to talk.91 
Mühlmann thus believes that Horkheimer was not, in fact, interested in biology as a 
disciplinary problem, but rather only that Horkheimer used the term as a red herring to 
get his attention.  He thus underestimates Horkheimer’s motivations for including biology 
in the range of disciplines addressed by the ZfS.  Thurnwald responded on 2 March 1932, 
acceding to Mühlmann’s adversarial reading with a comment that: “The journal is clearly 
a competitive undertaking, as I see.”  For Thurnwald, however, it is not the disciplinary 
issues raised by Mühlmann that best explain his own animosity.  Rather it is the Marxist 
orientation of Horkheimer and his colleagues: “But we have the bilingual form as an 
advantage, and perhaps a few ideas.  The others clearly bore away at Marxism, which 
they disguise.”92 
Horkheimer’s early scholarship indicates that he was well aware of the many and 
complex valences of the term biology, and of the ongoing debates in sociology, 
psychology, and philosophy about biology’s status as a foundational discipline.  
Nonetheless the way that biology arises selectively in Horkheimer’s language emerges 
                                                 
91  Mühlmann to Thurnwald, 20 February 1932, 2-3.  “Der beiliegende Prospekt unserer ‘Konkurrenz’ wird 
Sie interessieren.  Das erste Heft ist noch nicht erschienen.  Ich muss dem Verlag noch ein paar 
verbindliche Worte über dies sein neuestes Kind schreiben, schon weil ich im Herbst so heftig zum Kampf 
geblasen habe.  Das Vorwort entspricht ungefähr dem, was mir Herr Prof. Horkheimer seinerzeit zu 
verstehen gab.  Damals sprach er allerdings von einem “Fruchtbarmachen” der Ökonomik, Geschichte, 
Psychologie und Biologie.  Diesmal fehlt die Biologie!  Das beweist mir, dass Herr Horkheimer damals mit 
ganz bestimmten, auf mich eingestellten Absichten hierherkam.  ‘Biologie’ sollte ein ein [sic] Köder sein, 
der mich gesprächig machen sollte.”  Emphasis original. 
92 Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 2 March 1932, 2.  “Die Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung ist deutlich eine 
Konkurrenzunternehmung, wie ich sehe. [...]  Aber wir haben die Zweisprachigkeit voraus, und vielleicht 
einige Ideen.  Die anderen bohren natürlich im Marxismus, was sie verschleiern.” 
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from its potential, but never clearly defined, overlap with his concept of multivalent 
materialism as research method and model of scholarship.  Horkheimer never did 
programmatically define the relationship between biology and his goals for the ZfS and 
the Institut.  Rather, he recognized biology’s qualities as a negative disciplinary concept 
that itself required elucidation.  He also realized that the qualities of his own multivalent 
materialism could be clarified through the exploration of some of the issues of biological 
disciplinarity.  Nonetheless he always addressed the problem through the lens of 
philosophy.  Thurnwald and Mühlmann misunderstood Horkheimer’s goals because they 
read his arguments as pointing primarily to the Marxist-inflected dialectical of 
materialism, rather than to the mechanistic valence prominent in the natural sciences. 
Horkheimer’s first letter to Thurnwald is dated 6 August 1932.  It is brief, but is 
written in a collegial tone.  Horkheimer explains that he had been seriously ill for several 
months – a situation that is also explained in a footnote to his introductory essay 
published in the first volume of the ZfS – and that his illness, combined with Thurnwald’s 
absence from Berlin, delayed his intended visit to Thurnwald.  He succinctly explains his 
goals for the ZfS and its multi-disciplinary approach:  
I hope that the goals of the journal will not be unsympathetic to you.  The 
essential point consists of concentrating the results of various branches of 
knowledge more decidedly on the problem of contemporary society than has 
taken place up to now.93 
                                                 
93  Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 6 August 1932, 1.  ‘Ich hoffe, dass Ihnen die Ziele der Zeitschrift nicht 
unsympathisch sein mögen.  Ein Wesentliches besteht darin, die Ergebnisse verschiedener Wissenszweige 
noch entscheidender auf das Problem der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft zu konzentrieren, als es bisher 
geschehen ist.’ 
   
 45
Horkheimer still hopes to be able to visit Thurnwald personally, and to suggest to him 
that he collaborate with the ZfS. 
 Thurnwald apparently received Horkheimer’s letter promptly, although 
Horkheimer had addressed it to Berlin.  Thurnwald was at the time residing in Big Shanty 
Camp, North River, Warren County, New York, where mail from Berlin was rapidly 
forwarded to him via New Haven.  He had clearly accepted Mühlmann’s negative reading 
of Horkheimer’s intent by this time.  On 29 August 1932, he revealed this in a letter to 
Wilhelm Kohlhammer, whose Stuttgart publishing house was a subsidiary firm of C. L. 
Hirschfeld in Leipzig, and who apparently had substantial administrative authority over 
scholarly journals published under the Hirschfeld imprint.  Thurnwald expresses 
displeasure at both the competition to Sociologus/ZVS that the ZfS represents, and also at 
Horkheimer’s Marxism: 
All of the addresses and contacts that I imparted to Hirschfeld publishers over the 
years are now being exploited to propagate the competition to Sociologus.  Mr. 
Horkheimer and his minions have succeeded in talking the representatives of 
Hirschfeld publishers into the idea that the new journal is no competition, and that 
Sociologus has to limit itself to social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) while Mr. 
Horkheimer taps true sociology (namely Marxist).  It is not enough that Mr. 
Horkheimer thereby imitates the organization of Sociologus (even if pathetically) 
– in places he takes over our words almost verbatim.  That does not demonstrate 
quick-wittedness, but rather only “machinations (Mache).” […]  When Mr. 
Horkheimer says that he concentrates the results of various branches of 
knowledge more decidedly on the problem of contemporary society than has been 
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the case up to now, he overlooks the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Soziologie.94 
Thurnwald goes on to express to Kohlhammer praise for Mühlmann’s skepticism about 
Horkheimer’s intentions.  On 4 September 1932 he then wrote to Mühlmann personally, 
repeating his negative opinion of Horkheimer’s intentions and Marxist political views, 
and again praising Mühlmann for his skepticism.  He ironically tells Mühlmann that 
should Horkheimer’s intended visit to him in Berlin actually come to pass, then he is 
“truly not at home (wahrlich nicht zu Hause).”95  The letter indicates, however, that it 
was not out of personal investment in the capitalist economic order that Thurnwald drew 
his disdain for Horkheimer and his plans.  He reports to Mühlmann his belief that the 
United States, in the depths of the Great Depression, is in a period of “cultural overhaul,” 
in which “the old varnish of capitalist swindles, bribes, and the like is beginning to be 
morally devalued.”96  At this point, Mühlmann’s thoroughly negative opinion had carried 
the day. 
Kohlhammer did not share Thurnwald’s displeasure with Horkheimer and the ZfS.  
He wrote Thurnwald on 19 September 1932, drawing a response from Thurnwald on 3 
October 1932 in which Thurnwald reiterated his negative opinion.  He dismisses 
                                                 
94  Thurnwald to Kohlhammer, 29 August 1932, 1.  “…[A]lle meine im Laufe der Jahre dem Verlag 
Hirschfeld mitgeteilten Adressen und Winke werden jetzt benutzt, um die Konkurrenz von SOCIOLOGUS 
zu propagieren.  Es ist Herrn Horkheimer und seinem Gefolge geglückt, den Vertreter des Verlages 
Hirschfeld einzureden, dass die neue Zeitschrift keine Konkurrenz ist, dass ‘Sociologus’ sich auf 
‘Völkerpsychologie’ zu beschränken habe, während Herr Horkheimer die echte Soziologie (Nämlich die 
marxistische) verzapft.  Nicht genug damit imitiert Herr Horkheimer den SOCIOLOGUS in der Einteilung 
(wenn auch kläglich) und stellenweise nimmt er fast wörtlich die Worte von uns über.  Das zeigt nicht von 
Scharfsinn, sondern nur von „Mache”.  [...]  Wenn Herr Horkheimer sagt, dass er die Ergebniss [sic] 
verschiedener Wissenszweige besser auf das Problem der Gesellschaft konzentriert, als bisher der Fall war, 
so übersieht er die Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie.” 
95  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 4 September 1932, 1. 
96  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 4 September 1932, 1.  “Kulturüberholung… der alte Firnis kapitalistischer 
Schwindeleien, Bestechungen u.dgl. beginnt moralisch entwertet zu werden.” 
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Kohlhammer’s suggestion that his fears are only “seeing the worst (Schwarzsehen).”97  
Kohlhammer then discussed the issue with Horkheimer directly, who took the discussion 
as the basis for a long two-page letter to Thurnwald on 7 November 1932.  After initial 
niceties about his respect for Thurnwald’s “scholarly achievement (wissenschaftliche 
Leistung),” and his surprise at Thurnwald’s concerns about competition between their 
journals, Horkheimer explains that he had, in fact, wished to retain Grünberg’s title for 
the Institut’s journal, but that Grünberg himself had insisted on a name change.  
Horkheimer thus chose a name for the journal that paralleled the name of the Institut: 
“That we then chose a title that corresponds with the name of our institute was certainly 
the obvious thing.”98  He goes on to explain that the ZfS intends to concentrate its 
editorial policy on work by members of the Institut.  Thurnwald’s concerns that the ZfS 
represents competition should thus, in time, clearly be allayed.  Horkheimer concludes 
with a paragraph reiterating his surprise and disappointment at Thurnwald’s misgivings.  
He recalls his earlier plan to visit Thurnwald personally and to request his assistance: 
How little I anticipated that the publication of our journal could displease you 
might also come to light in my desire last year to visit you, along with other 
interested colleagues.  This was in order to request that you inform us of 
appropriate works in your discipline that bear consideration for a review in our 
journal.  It should pain me greatly if your concerns – which are most decidedly 
                                                 
97  Thurnwald to Kohlhammer, 3 October 1932, 1. 
98  Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 7 November 1932, 1.  “Dass wir dann einen Titel gewählt haben, der mir 
dem Namen unseres Instituts übereinstimmt, war doch gewiss das Nächstliegende.” 
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unfounded – prevented the development of the relationship between both journals 
into one of fruitful mutual supplementation.99 
Horkheimer clearly had no intention of allowing Thurnwald’s concerns to damage the 
publication prospects of the ZfS, but he just as clearly hoped to apply his considerable 
reserves of administrative talent, diplomacy, and charm to manage successfully his 
relations with an important academic colleague. 
 Thurnwald realized at this point that Horkheimer’s attitude, combined with 
Kohlhammer’s general support for the ZfS, meant that he had little chance of preventing 
the publication of the ZfS by C. L. Hirschfeld.  He responded to Horkheimer on 15 
December 1932 with a very short letter that gives no indication of the dissatisfaction that 
he had voiced vigorously to Mühlmann and Kohlhammer.  He had apparently resigned 
himself to the publication of the ZfS, and saw no reason to continue to treat Horkheimer 
uncollegially by ignoring his letters.  He thus takes the civil path opened by Horkheimer.  
He reworks Horkheimer’s own words about his hopes for a mutually productive 
enterprise: “I too nurture the sincere wish that both journals might supplement each 
other.”100  Horkheimer responded, concisely but cordially, on 28 January 1933.  He 
thanks Thurnwald for his thoughts, and expresses hope that they will have the chance to 
meet personally once Thurnwald returns to Germany.  Given the political situation of the 
moment, however, there was little immediate prospect of such a meeting, and the 
                                                 
99  Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 7 November 1932, 2.  “Wie wenig ich bis heute geahnt hatte, dass Ihnen das 
Erscheinen unserer Zeitschrift missfallen könnte, mag auch daraus hervorgehen, dass ich Sie letztes Jahr, 
wie einige andere interessierte Kollegen, besuchen wollte, um Sie zu bitten, uns jeweils die Arbeiten aus 
Ihrem Fach, welche für eine Besprechung in unserer Zeitschrift in Betracht kommen, mitzuteilen.  Es sollte 
mir aufrichtig leid tun, wenn Ihre Bedenken, die ganz entschieden unberechtigt sind, es verhinderten, dass 
sich das Verhältnis der beiden Zeitschriften zu dem einer wissenschaftlich fruchtbaren gegenseitigen 
Ergänzung ausbildete.” 
100  Thurnwald to Horkheimer, 15 December 1932.  “Auch ich hege den aufrichtigen Wunsch, dass sich 
beide Zeitschriften ergänzen mögen.” 
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correspondence therefore breaks off here.  There is no indication in the Thurnwald papers 
or in the Horkheimer-Pollock Archive of any direct personal contact or correspondence 
between Horkheimer and Thurnwald after this final letter. 
 
National Socialism, Race Biology, and Social Research 
  
 Thurnwald’s relationship with Mühlmann took a somewhat rougher turn at just 
this time, however.  Almost a year before, they had discussed the methods and goals of 
race biology and race hygiene, and Mühlmann had felt it necessary to defend his own 
training in and advocacy for race biology.  Now, after Thurnwald had at first accepted 
Mühlmann’s negative reading of Horkheimer’s intentions but then realized that he would 
not be able to thwart them, the issue of Mühlmann’s investment in race biology became 
an opportunity for Thurnwald to reestablish his authority as the senior scholar in their 
working relationship through a renewed critique of race biology.  The immediate political 
stakes of the National Socialist appropriation of race biology further inflect his 
comments.  Remarkably, Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues remained a present 
element in this conflict.  Horkheimer’s own assertion of the importance of biology for the 
Institut and ZfS meant that when biological fields and terms became a moment of 
contention in the collaboration between Thurnwald and Mühlmann, they could use him 
and their mutually expressed disdain for him as a means of deflecting some of the 
personal friction of their own intellectual conflict.  Horkheimer thus remained a source of 
derision in Thurnwald’s and Mühlmann’s correspondence for some months after he was 
no longer in direct contact with either of them. 
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The proximate cause of their disagreement was an unspecified article manuscript 
by Walter Scheidt, Mühlmann’s teacher in Hamburg, that Mühlmann had forwarded to 
Thurnwald in New York State.  On 15 December 1932, the same day he wrote his letter 
to Horkheimer, Thurnwald informed Mühlmann of his receipt of the Scheidt manuscript.  
Only one week later, on 22 December 1932, Thurnwald wrote Mühlmann again with an 
extensive and thoroughgoing critique of Scheidt’s ideas and methods.  Thurnwald finds 
the essay to be nothing more than “juggling with slogans (Herumjonglieren mit 
Schlagworten).”  He reiterates his own sympathy for biological thinking, but finds 
Scheidt’s work – work that included a 1930 monograph on Kulturbiologie – to be nothing 
of the sort: “As you know, my stance toward biological points of view is very 
sympathetic.  For that very reason this work appears to be inadequate to me.”101  He even 
criticizes general trends in German scholarship by associating them with Scheidt’s self-
important style: “Everything is excessively ambitiously puffed up: ‘Nonsense, nonsense’ 
etc., then the underlining of entire paragraphs.  Those are psychological indications for 
the immense – but in Germany impressive – self-overestimation of Mr. Scheidt.”102  He 
then hints that Scheidt would find a better home in competing journals.  While he does 
not mention the ZfS by name, his derisory recommendation that Scheidt send his 
“delectable fruits (köstlichen Früchte)” to the “competition (Konkurrenz)” must be 
understood, in the context of past and future comments and of the conflict with 
Horkheimer over the previous months, as a veiled reference to the Frankfurt project.103  
                                                 
101  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 1.  “Ich stehe persönlich, wie Sie wissen, den 
biologischen Standpunkten sehr sympathisch gegenüber.  Gerade darum aber scheint mir diese Arbeit 
unzureichend.” 
102  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 1.  “Alles ist ungeheuer anspruchsvoll aufplustert: 
‘Unsinn’, ‘Unsinn’, etc. dann Unterstreichungen über ganze Absätze hin.  Das sind psychologische Indizien 
für die ungeheuere, aber in Deutschland imponierende, Selbstüberschätzung Herrn Scheidt’s.” 
103  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 2. 
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Mühlmann responded on 7 January 1933, regretting that he would therefore have to reject 
Scheidt’s article, and fearing that this rejection would precipitate a break with Scheidt 
and his colleagues in Hamburg.  Thurnwald responded sympathetically on 20 January 
1933, but reiterated his sweeping condemnation of Scheidt’s methods and results: 
“Science exists not by ‘belief’ but by ‘proof.’  That is what is misjudged here [in 
Germany].  Thus the collapse of German science.”104  Thurnwald and Mühlmann 
continued to discuss this matter in several more letters, and as their discussion 
progressed, it became more and more significantly focused on Scheidt’s claim to be 
doing ‘biological anthropology’ or ‘Kulturbiologie.’  Thurnwald explained his opinion 
most thoroughly in a lengthy letter to Mühlmann on 3 February 1933, in which he noted 
that although he had found Scheidt’s early ethnological work interesting, “his theoretical 
works are powerfully misguided.”105 
Both Thurnwald’s opinion and Mühlmann’s fears of Scheidt’s response to the 
rejection of his article were apparently well founded, for in 1935, Mühlmann sought his 
Habilitation in Hamburg with a manuscript on “State Formation and Amphictyonies in 
Polynesia (Staatsbildung und Amphyktionien in Polynesien).”  Of the four readers of 
Mühlmann’s manuscript, only Scheidt evaluated the work negatively.  Ute Michel 
describes Scheidt’s intellectual and political justifications for his rejection.  The similarity 
of her paraphrase of Scheidt’s reasons for rejection bears enough similarity to 
Thurnwald’s disdain for Scheidt’s work and methods to raise the possibility that Scheidt 
was retaliating for Mühlmann’s accession to Thurnwald’s criticisms.  Nonetheless the 
political realities of 1935 surely played an even more significant role, and despite 
                                                 
104  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 20 January 1933, 2.  “Wissenschaft besteht nicht in ‘Glauben’, sondern in 
‘Beweis’.  Das verkennt man bei uns.  Darum der Verfall der deutschen Wissenschaft.” 
105  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 3 February 1933, 7.  “...seine theoretischen Arbeiten hauen scharf daneben.” 
   
 52
Mühlmann’s widely expressed support for National Socialism, Scheidt accused him of 
endangering the political rectitude of the younger academic generation: 
Scheidt justifies his judgment with the argument that Mühlmann had distanced 
himself from a solid, scholarly mode of work, and thus might, with his teaching 
and research, lead parts of the academic youth down paths leading away from the 
National Socialist state.106 
The Nazi system’s incentivization of political denunciation as a means to academic and 
professional prestige – sometimes especially among individuals who were apparently 
strongly committed to the success of the party – was already well developed by this time. 
Remarkably, as the Nazis consolidated their power in Germany in early 1933, 
Horkheimer’s behavior remained a point of reference between Thurnwald and 
Mühlmann, and they associated what they perceived to be Horkheimer’s scholarly 
opportunism with the Nazis’ political behavior.  On 2 April 1933, Thurnwald wrote to 
Mühlmann and included some lengthy political rumination on his ambivalence about the 
rise of the Nazis.  “I always fear German ‘enthusiasm,’” he wrote, indicating disdain for 
the events of 1914, 1918/1919, and 1933.  And about Horkheimer, he asked snidely: 
“How is our marxistic competition digesting the new regime?  Have the people become 
Nazis?”107  With this reiteration of Thurnwald’s derisory opinion of what he perceived to 
be Horkheimer’s opportunistic stance, the controversy dissipated into the clouds of 
political uncertainty that had overtaken Europe. 
                                                 
106  Michel 77.  “Sein Urteil begründet Scheidt damit, daß sich Mühlmann von solider wissenschaftlicher 
Arbeitsweise entfernt habe und nun mit seiner Lehre und Forschung Teile der akademischen Jugend auf 
vom nationalsozialistischen Staat abführende Wege leiten könnte.” 
107  Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 2 April 1933, 2, 4.  “Ich fürchte immer die deutsche ‘Begeisterung’. [...]  Wie 
bekommt unserer marzistischen [sic] Konkurrenz das neue Regime?  Sind die Leute Nazis geworden?” 
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Despite Thurnwald’s distinctly negative opinion in early 1933, Horkheimer 
appears to have retained his positive regard for Thurnwald’s work and career, though 
perhaps with some irony about Thurnwald’s generally conservative political views.  
Upon Thurnwald’s death in 1954, Horkheimer wrote a traditional letter of condolence to 
his widow, Hilde Thurnwald.  His condolences were expressed in a tone appropriate to 
Thurnwald’s political reputation, with doubtlessly conscious military metaphor: “With 
Dr. Richard Thurnwald a human being has again departed who dedicated his life to 
scholarship and fought in an advance position.  I will honor his memory.”108  Hilde took 
over the editorship of the revived Sociologus after her husband’s death, and corresponded 
a few times with Horkheimer about editorial questions like choosing qualified book 
reviewers. 
Mühlmann also reestablished a working relationship with Horkheimer after the 
war.  He twice turned to Horkheimer in the 1950s and 1960s for support during 
controversies.  The first of these controversies is revealing: in it, Mühlmann resigned 
from the editorial board of Homo, the journal of the German Society for Anthropology 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Anthropologie).  He had sought to publish a review of a book 
by the formerly Nazi-affiliated race theorist Hans F. K. Günther entitled Gattenwahl zu 
ehelichem Glück und erblicher Ertüchtigung (Spousal Choice for Marital Happiness and 
Hereditary Strengthening; Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1951), which was a new 
edition of a book originally published in 1940.  In his review Mühlmann sought to draw 
attention cryptically to what he claimed were the “depredations” that “these ideas called 
                                                 
108  Horkheimer to Hilde Thurnwald, 26 January 1954, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main 
[III, 13, 62].  “Mit Dr. Richard Thurnwald ist wieder ein Mensch dahingegangen, der sein Leben der 
Wissenschaft verschrieben hatte und auf Außenposten kämpfte.  Ich werde sein Andenken in Ehren 
halten.” 
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forth in Germany only a few years ago.”109  The editor-in-chief of Homo, the 
anthropologist Egon von Eickstedt, twice asked him to moderate this allusion, and 
Mühlmann resisted.  Given that neither Günther nor Mühlmann had been punished, 
imprisoned, or banned from academic work for their Nazi affiliations, and that both had 
rapidly and successfully reestablished their careers in West Germany after the war, this 
episode represents Mühlmann’s desire to distance himself from his own complicity in 
Nazi policies and crimes.  Ute Michel emphasizes how Mühlmann’s sought consistently 
after the war to highlight his own lack of responsibility in her detailed critical resume of 
his career.110  That Mühlmann had even testified as a witness for the defense in Günther’s 
denazification trial in 1947 redoubles the evidence for this self-exculpatory motivation.111  
There is no evidence that Horkheimer responded to Mühlmann’s 1952 letter.  
Nonetheless, there is also no evidence that Horkheimer himself doubted or questioned 
Mühlmann’s scholarly motivations, for in a further controversy from 1960 about the 
doctoral curriculum in Soziologie at Heidelberg, Horkheimer lent personal support to 
Mühlmann’s insistence that history not be deemphasized as a required companion 
discipline.112  After this, however, there is no evidence of scholarly contact between 
them. 
 
Conclusion: Biology as Boundary Condition  
 
                                                 
109  Mühlmann to “die Mitherausgeber von HOMO sowie einige andere anthropologische Fachkollegen,” 
20 August 1952, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main [III, 10, 303].  “Verheerungen...diese 
Ideen noch vor wenigen Jahren in Deutschland hervorgerufen haben.” 
110  Michel, “Mühlmann,” 100-102.  She calls him “scholar without responsibility (Wissenschaftler ohne 
Verantwortung).” 
111  Michel, “Mühlmann,” 101. 
112  Horkheimer to Mühlmann, 17 July 1960, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main [III, 27, 23-
24]. 
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As Horkheimer developed the principles of Critical Theory in the mid-1930s, the 
stakes of these questions and disciplinary boundary zones did not dissipate.  The most 
important place where biology arises in his widely disseminated essays from this period 
is found in the 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory (Traditionelle und kritische 
Theorie).”113  In it Horkheimer outlines the principles of a kind of inquiry that, growing 
out of the ‘interdisciplinary materialism’ of the early 1930s, might avoid the tendency for 
theoretical work on social relations to become captured and made unproductive by its 
own vested interests in disciplinary and institutional power.  After Horkheimer has 
sketched the character of critical theory as inquiry that embeds an understanding of its 
own social position and disciplinary power into its methods, he addresses potential 
arguments against the uniqueness of his proposed mode of critical thought.  It is 
specifically biology, the science that straddles the physico-chemical and the social-
behavioral, for which critical theory might be most easily mistaken: 
The necessity that dominates society could in this sense be seen as biological, and 
the special character of critical theory could thus be doubted, because in biology, 
as in other natural sciences, individual processes are theoretically construed in a 
similar way as happens in the critical theory of society, according to the 
explanation above.114 
                                                 
113  Two of Horkheimer’s essays from 1935 and 1936 on “philosophical anthropology” address his 
developing views of biology as well: “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie,” ZfS 4 (1935), 
and “Egoismus und Freheitsbewegung (Zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters),” ZfS 5 (1936).  See: 
Pierson, Leaving Marxism, 101-2. 
114  Max Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: Vier 
Aufsätze (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970) 45.  Originally in ZfS 6 (1937).  “Die 
Notwendigkeit, von der die Gesellschaft beherrscht wird, könnte in diesem Sinn als biologisch angesehen 
und der besondere Charakter der kritischen Theorie deshalb bezweifelt werden, weil in der Biologie wie 
auch in anderen Naturwissenschaften in ähnlicher Weise einzelne Verläufe theoretisch konstruiert werden, 
wie es nach dem oben Dargelegten in der kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft geschieht.” 
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Horkheimer’s earlier reflections on purposiveness in Kantian philosophy resonate here.  
He believes that theoretical work always requires arguments about cause and necessity in 
the relationships between phenomena, and that the biological approach to the living 
organism thus has many parallels to a potential critical theory of society. 
Horkheimer must then also address a commonplace analogy in biological thought 
and argument: the claim that society is a kind of organism, and (indirectly) that inquiry 
into social phenomena can best be reduced to inquiry into living things.  He dismisses 
such arguments with a reminder that the parts of an organism, unlike the members of 
society, are not mediated through reason.  Here his youthful Gestalt-holist arguments 
about emergent phenomena themselves return: 
Reason cannot become transparent to itself as long as human beings act as the 
limbs of an organism without reason.  As a naturally growing and dissipating 
unity, the organism is not a sort of model for society, but rather a hollow form of 
being from which it must emancipate itself.115 
Those who pursue critical theory must therefore be aware of slippage between it and 
biological modes of thought, in order to avoid any appearance that critical theory is 
simply biology by another name. 
Horkheimer’s work in the early critical theory period thus interrogates biology 
through the broader stakes of the rereading of materialism.  Critical theory had to be 
interested in biology because the concept of biology itself demonstrated that the 
intractable problems of disciplinary distinction in the life sciences functioned in parallel 
                                                 
115  Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” 28-29.  „Die Vernunft kann sich selbst nicht 
durchsichtig werden, solange die Menschen als Glieder eines vernuftlosen Organismus handeln.  Der 
Organismus als natürlich wachsende und vergehende Einheit ist für die Gesellschaft nicht etwa ein Vorbild, 
sondern eine dumpfe Seinsform, aus der sie sich zu emanzipieren hat.” 
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with claims to total theoretical explanation – including the explanation of social 
phenomena.  Life scientists participated in biology as a narrative of complete knowledge 
of living things and their environments, and because those environments could be read 
socially, social scientists also participated similarly.  Biology allowed scholars of the 
living, the human, and the social to make both narrowly focused investigational claims 
and claims about human affairs that breached the categories of the political and 
ideological.  Direct sub-disciplinary associations and investigational techniques tended to 
insulate life scientists from criticism that their claims were too broad.  Social scientists 
rarely had that luxury, yet they could not easily differentiate themselves from the sphere 
of biology.  Biology thus necessarily formed a primary boundary around the interests of 
Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues, and their encounters with that boundary brought 
them into contact and conflict with scholars like Thurnwald and Mühlmann who were 
pursuing similar goals mapped onto other disciplinary and conceptual categories.  
Biology seemed to describe the limits of all of the fields of research into social 
phenomena that these scholars were working to establish, including Sozialforschung, 
Soziologie, and Völkersoziologie, and they themselves came to understand and to 
represent it as the spark of their disagreements.  The National Socialist appropriation of 
socially oriented biological argument further raised the stakes of their conflicts because it 
threw all personal political interests and investments into high relief.  Seventy years later 
the troubled encounter between biology and social research remains an ever-present 
source of rancor. 
